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A Biologic Argument for Gay
Essentialism-Determinism: Implications
for Equal Protection and Substantive
Due Process
E. Gary Spitko*
I try to tighten my heart into a knot, a snarl, I try to learn to live
dead, just numb, but then I see someone I want, and it's like a nail,
like a hot spike right through my chest, and I know I'm losing.'
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,2 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that sexual orientation is a conduct-based classification,
and, indeed, relates to conduct that the state may criminalizeA For
this reason, the court concluded, such a classification is not subject to
heightened scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.4
* Associate, Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Atlanta, Georgia; A.B., 1987,
Cornell University; J.D., 1991, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to
Owen D. Jones for suggesting to me that I write about the implications of science for
the law relating to sexual orientation. Also, I am thankful for the helpful comments
of Paul T. Cappuccio, Christopher A. Crain, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Stephen
A. Miller and Charles A. Shanor on an earlier draft of this article. Finally, I conducted
much of the research for this article while I was an associate at Covington & Burling
in Washington, D.C. and am deeply indebted to that firm and especially to Carolyn
F. Corwin for her assistance and support.
TONY KUSHNER, ANGELS IN AMERICA: MILLENNIUM APPROACHES, Act II, Scene 9
(1992) ("Joseph Pitt" to his wife "Harper").
2 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 464-65.
Id. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to
the federal government as part of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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Conversely, the district court in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati
v. Cincinnati,5 rejected the notion "that homosexuality is a status defined
by conduct" and held that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect clas-
sification. 6 These cases are two of many in which a court's notion as
to the nature and origin of homosexuality influenced the way the court
applied the law to gay people.7
This phenomenon echoes that which exists more generally in con-
temporary American society. It is often the case that a person's beliefs
as to the nature and origin of homosexuality are a great influence on
her position with respect to how she and society should interact with
gay people.8
1 860 F. Supp. 417 (W.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
6 Id. at 436, 439-40. See also High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 909 F.2d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) ("It is an error of massive proportions to define the entire class
of homosexuals by sodomy .... [H]omosexuality, like heterosexuality, is a status....
[Olne is a homosexual or a heterosexual while playing bridge just as much as while
engaging in sexual activity.").
' See J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (up-
holding restrictions on a gay father's visitations with his son based, inter alia, on the
court's conclusion that the father's activities evidenced his desire to induce his son to
become gay); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81-82 (N.D. 1981) (reversing
an award of custody to a lesbian mother on the grounds, inter alia, that her children
might be more likely to become gay or lesbian if left in her custody); Gaylord v.
Tacoma Sch. Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977) (upholding the dismissal of a
gay school teacher emphasizing the danger that the presence of an openly gay teacher
might encourage imitation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). See also Baehr v. Lewin,
74 Haw. 530, 584-87, 852 P.2d 44, 66-70 (1993) (Burns, J., concurring) (reasoning
that whether sexual orientation is "biologically fated" is crucial to a determination of
whether the Hawaii constitution should be read to proscribe the state from permitting
opposite-sex marriages while not permitting same-sex marriages).
8 See, e.g., Neil L. Glazer, Straight Talk About Homosexuality, HARV. L. REC., March
5, 1993, at 15 ("[T]he very idea of equating homosexual 'rights' with those of African-
Americans or women is absurd; for unlike the former, being black or a woman relates
to personhood, and is non-behavioral in origin. I simply cannot accept the argument
that homosexuality is an innate and unalterable characteristic, since I have seen too
many testimonials from former homosexuals who have been 'cured,' either by psy-
chological or spiritual healing."); Kim Painter, Studying the Nature of Being Gay, USA
TODAY, March 8, 1993, at 1D (Dr. Simon LeVay, a neurobiologist whose research
concerns the structure, function and development of the brain, positing that "[t]here
are a lot of people who've been taught that homosexuality is wrong, but [who] can
be persuaded (otherwise) by science"); Nancy E. Roman, Civil Rights for Homosexuals
Surfaces as Issue of the 90s, WASH. TIMES, January 4, 1993, at Al (legal scholar Bruce
Fein stating that if it could be demonstrated that sexual orientation was determined
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Some believe that homosexuality is defined by physical sexual activity
and, thus, does not exist apart from such activity. For those who hold
this belief there is no homosexual "orientation" only homosexual acts.
Andrew Sullivan has labeled one political manifestation of this notion
the "conservative politics of sexuality" the "fundamental assertion of
which is that . . . [h]omosexual behavior is aberrant activity, either on
the part of heterosexuals intent on subverting traditional society or by
people who are prey to psychological, emotional or sexual dysfunc-
tion. '"9 "The politics that springs out of this view of homosexuality
has two essential parts: with the depraved, it must punish: with the
sick, it must cure.'" 0
Antithetical to this "conservative politics of sexuality" is the idea
that homosexuality is an enduring predisposition toward an erotic,
affectional, and romantic attraction to individuals of one's own sex
that exists independent of any physical sexual act." Sullivan argues
at birth, the law would be more sympathetic to gay people). See also Joseph P. Shapiro
with Gareth G. Cook & Andrew Krackov, Straight Talk About Gays, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., July 5, 1993, at 42, 48 (citing to a poll demonstrating positive correlations
between the belief that gay people "choose to be gay" and opposition to gay civil
rights, and, conversely, between the belief that homosexuality is innate and support
for civil-rights laws for gay people).
But see, e.g., Painter, supra, at 1 D (April Martin, a lesbian psychotherapist, com-
menting that "[tihe question of whether homosexuals should have full legal rights and
civil rights and social acceptance (has) nothing whatsoever to do with whether we can
or can't help or change our inclination .... It has to do with the fact that it is morally
wrong to oppress people based on characteristics or behavior which cause no harm to
anything except the established social hierarchy.").
9 Andrew Sullivan, The Politics of Homosexuality, NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at
24. The American Psychiatric Association declared in 1973 that homosexuality is not
a form of mental illness and that "homosexuality per se implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities." Resolution
of the American Psychiatric Association, December 15, 1973. The American Psycho-
logical Association soon followed in 1975 with a similar resolution. American Psycho-
logical Association, Minutes of the Council of Representatives, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 633
(1975).
10 Sullivan, supra note 9, at 25. Similarly, Janet Halley has described this position
as "anti-gay constructivism" which "emphasizes the mutability of heterosexual ori-
entation, arguing that heterosexuality must be shored up by anti-gay discrimination,
or [which] points to the mutability of homosexual orientation, arguing that discrimi-
nation should be designed to convert gay men and lesbians to heterosexuality." Janet
E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 517 (1994).
" See Gregory M. Herek, Sexual Orientation, in 1 WOMEN'S STUDIES ENCYCLOPEDIA
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that "as long as . . . part of the population is involuntarily gay, then
the entire conservative politics of homosexuality rests on an unstable
footing. It becomes simply a politics of denial or repression .. .[which]
offends against fundamental notions of decency and civility .. . [and
is] not simply cruel but politically impossible in a civil order."' 2
In recent years scientists-sociologists, psychologists, physiologists
and geneticists-have begun to inform this debate. 3 They have pro-
duced the first evidence that the brains of gay men are physiologically
different than those of non-gay men and the first direct evidence that
homosexuality is genetically influenced.
This article surveys these recent discoveries and discusses their
importance for the development of the law related to sexual orientation
in two areas of federal constitutional law. Specifically, this article posits
that these findings speak to the reality of an irreducible essentialist 14
definition of what it means to be gay, the sole essential element of
which is a predominant same-sex erotic, affectional, and romantic
attraction, thereby dispelling the notion that a gay sexual orientation
does not exist apart from gay sexual conduct and, thus, refuting the
most frequently cited rationale for denying heightened scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause to classifications on the basis of sexual
orientation. Moreover, these findings speak also to the involuntary
nature of a gay sexual orientation and, thus, lend support to an
344-46 (H. Tierney ed., 1989) (defining sexual orientation); Equality Found. of Greater
Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (citing psychologist
Dr. John Gonsiorek's testimony that sexual orientation is "a predisposition toward
erotic, sexual, affiliation, or affection relationships toward one's own and/or the other
gender."), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995); Richard C. Friedman & Jennifer I.
Downey, Homosexuality, N. ENGL. J. MED. 331:923 (1994) (defining sexual orientation
as "a person's potential to respond with sexual excitement to persons of the same sex,
the opposite sex, or both").
12 Sullivan, supra note 9, at 25-26. See also U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("Equal Protection of the laws . ..must at the very least mean
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest.").
" See generally Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, THE ATLANTIC, March 1993,
at 47 (reviewing biological research into the nature of homosexuality).
14 See Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the
Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (1993) ("Essentialists in general
define gay people as those who experience same-sex desire, believe that there have
always been gay people everywhere, and hold that it makes sense to speak of people
who experience same-sex desire as a single group regardless of where and when they
lived. ").
574
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argument that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, should protect a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual erotic activity other than
sodomy."
" While the discussion in this article is limited to the implications of the scientific
findings discussed infra to federal constitutional law, these findings, and much of
discussion in this article, have relevance also to equal protection and privacy analysis
under many state constitutions. For example, in Kentucky v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
487 (Ky. 1992), the Supreme Court of Kentucky cited to expert medical and social
science testimony that sexual orientation is deeply rooted and not freely chosen in
holding that the state's restriction on same-sex sodomy violated the guarantee of equal
protection provided for in the Kentucky constitution. Id. at 489, 500.
Moreover, such findings, to the extent they support the view that sexual orientation
is innate and/or immutable, undermine the stated premise of those who seek to use
the law to discourage, prevent and protect people from becoming gay. See, e.g., Evans
v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo. 1994) (noting the State of Colorado's argument
that "laws prohibiting discrimination against gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals will
undermine marriages and heterosexual families because married heterosexuals will
'choose' to 'become homosexual' if discrimination against homosexuals is prohibited.");
Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987) (New Hampshire law forbidding
"homosexuals" -defined as persons who engage in certain sex acts-from adopting
children is rationally related to the interest in providing appropriate role models to
children in light of "the reasonable possibility of environmental influences" affecting
a child's future sexual orientation). See also supra note 7.
A misguided foray in the law into this area of science is seen in Baehr v. Lewin,
74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). In Baehr, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that
sex is a "suspect category" under the Hawaii constitution for purposes of equal
protection analysis and, thus, a statute that allowed opposite-sex marriages but not
same-sex marriages would be unconstitutional unless the state could demonstrate that
the statute is narrowly drawn to further a compelling interest. Id. at 579-80, 852 P.2d
at 66. The supreme court remanded the case for a trial, presently scheduled for
September 1996, on whether the statute could survive such heightened scrutiny. See
id. at 583, 852 P.2d at 68. In a concurring opinion that was necessary for the decision,
a judge sitting by designation concluded that the issue of whether sexual orientation
is innate is a question of fact that must be determined before the court can adjudicate
the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 584, 852 P.2d at 68 (Bums, J., concurring). The
concurring judge reasoned that if sexual orientation is innate, then a person's sex
would include his sexual orientation and the Hawaii constitution's proscription of
invidious sex discrimination would also proscribe invidious discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. Id. at 584-87, 852 P.2d at 68-70 (Bums, J., concurring). The
concurring opinion failed to explain, however, how other innate traits, such as eye
color, can be distinguished meaningfully from sexual orientation for the purpose of
determining which innate traits should be included in a person's sex. Moreover, as
the plurality in Baehr correctly pointed out, if, as the findings discussed infra suggest,
sexual orientation relates merely to erotic, affectional and romantic desire, then a
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A familiarity with these recent scientific findings is prerequisite to
fully understanding the constitutional arguments set forth in this article.
Part II, below, therefore, sets forth a layman's description of the
relevant recent findings in neurophysiology, genealogy and genetics,
that give new insight into the nature and origins of homosexuality.
II. THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF HOMOSEXUALITY
A. Hypothalamic Dimorphism
Simon LeVay, a neurobiologist who studies the structure, function
and development of the brain, has in recent years turned his attention
to studying the physiological basis of sexual orientation.' 6 LeVay has
focused his attention particularly on the hypothalamus. The hypothal-
amus is a group of brain nuclei, 7 about a teaspoonful of tissue, that
plays a key role in sex."' Each nucleus in the hypothalamus can be
identified by its distinct size, shape, position, chemical constituents,
and pattern of synaptic connections with other nuclei. 19
LeVay theorizes that "male-typical" and "female-typical" sexual
feelings and behavior originate in separate centers in the hypothala-
mus. 10 Ablation studies, in which small regions of the brain are
deliberately destroyed,2 and stimulation experiments, in which an
electrical stimulus is applied to a part of the brain, support his theory. 2
In many animal species, the male will mount females less readily, or
not at all, after the medial preoptic area (which contains several nuclei)
statute that does not allow same-sex marriage discriminates on the basis of sex but
not on the basis of sexual orientation. See id. at 543 n.l, 852 P.2d at 52 n.l
("Parties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or heter-
osexuals.").
" See SIMON LEVAY, THE SEXUAL BRAIN (1994) (discussing generally the brain
mechanisms that are believed to be responsible for sexual behavior).
" Id. at 37. A brain nucleus is a large clusters of neurons. This type of nucleus is
distinct from and not to be confused with the nucleus of a cell. Id.
"I Id. at 39. Men who have had hypothalamic nuclei destroyed frequently report a
reduction in sexual desires and behavior. Id. at 80.
19 Id. at 44-45.
20 Id. at 71.
2 See J.C. Slimp et al., Heterosexual, Autosexual and Social Behavior of Adult Male Rhesus
Monkeys With Medial Preoptic-Anterior Hypothalamic Lesions, BRAIN RESEARCH 142:105-22
(1978).
"2 See LEVAY, supra note 16, at 72.
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of the hypothalamus is destroyed.2 3 Male rats and ferrets even show
increased female typical behavior, such as lordosis,24 after suffering
lesions in the medial preoptic area.25 Conversely, electrical stimulation
of the medial preoptic area increases male copulatory behavior in these
animals.2 6 Also, experiments recording the natural electrical activity of
individual neurons in the hypothalamus of male monkeys have dem-
onstrated that many neurons in the medial preoptic area increase
electrical activity during sexual arousal. 27 From these observations,
LeVay concludes that the medial preoptic area plays a key role in
male-typical sexual behavior.2 8
Further support for LeVay's theory comes from the fact that the
medial preoptic region, in rodents as well as in humans, is sexually
dimorphic in that at least one nucleus in the region is larger, on
average, in males than in females.2 9 In humans, this nucleus is called
the INAH-3 (short for third interstitial nuclei of the anterior hypo-
thalamus) and is two to three times larger in males than in females.3 °
Most significantly, LeVay has found that the INAH-3 in the brains
of gay men is, on average, the same size as in women and two to
three times smaller than in non-gay men.3' From this, LeVay concludes
that gay men differ from non-gay men "in the central neuronal
mechanisms that regulate [male] sexual behavior. ' 32
This same pattern of sexual and orientational dimorphism is seen
with respect to the anterior commissure, which is an axonal connection
between the left and right hemispheres of the cerebral cortex. The
anterior commissure is larger, on average, in women than in men. 33
Id. at 72.
2' Id. at 47-48. Lordosis, a term most frequently applied to rodent behavior, is the
flexing of the back in a "U" shape so as to expose the genital area for intromission
by a male.
11 Id. at 72.
26 Id.
21 Id. at 73.
28 Id.
29 See L.S. Allen et al., Two Sexually Dimorphic Cell Groups In the Human Brain, J.
NEUROSCIENCE 9:497-506 (1989); LEVAY, supra note 16, at 75. Scientists also have
found that the shape and position of synapses and the distribution of several neuro-
transmitters in the medial preoptic area of rats are sexually dimorphic. Id. at 77.
0 LEVAY, supra note 16, at 76, 120-21.
31 Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homo-
sexual Men, SCIENCE 253:1034 (1991); LEVAY, supra note 16, at 120-22.
32 See LeVay, supra note 16, at 121.
3 Id. at 123.
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Recently, researchers have determined that the anterior commissure of
gay men, on average, is also larger than in non-gay men and is even
larger than in women. 3
These neuroanatomical studies do not prove that sexual orientation
is caused by the physiological dimorphism they uncovered. It may be,
for example, that the difference in the size of the INAH-3 does not
cause homosexuality, but rather, gay sex causes the INAH-3 to shrink. 35
LeVay points to the difference in the sizes of the anterior commissures
of gay men and non-gay men, however, and argues that since this
region of the brain is not known to have any function related to the
regulation of sexual behavior, it is unlikely that disparate sexual
behavior among gay men and non-gay men is responsible for the
difference in size. 3 6 More likely, LeVay argues, the differentiation
comes about during the prenatal differentiation of the brain, possibly
because of the influence of hormone levels.3 7
Unfortunately, the INAH-3 is too small to image in living subjects
with available equipment and techniques.3 8 Thus, LeVay's studies were
performed using brains from cadavers. The anterior commissure, how-
ever, is large enough to be seen, although not clearly, in contemporary
magnetic resonance images ("MRI scans"). 3 9 With modest improve-
ments in technique, scientists should be able to measure accurately this
region of the brain in living subjects.4° Thus, it soon should be possible
to study subjects longitudinally beginning in preadolescence (before
sexual behavior) to determine if differentiation precedes sexual behav-
ior. A finding that orientational dimorphism precedes sexual behavior
31 L.S. Allen & R.A. Gorski, Sexual Orientation and the Size of the Anterior Commissure
in the Human Brain, PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci., 89:7199 (1992); LEVAY, supra note 16,
at 123. As a percentage of total brain size, the anterior commissure of gay men is
about equal the size of the anterior commissure of women. Id.
11 DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH FOR
THE GAY GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 163 (1994). See also LEVAY, supra note
16, at 122 (one cannot conclude from LeVay's observations whether the structural
differences are innate and cause men to become gay or whether the sexual behavior
of gay men leads to the structural differences).
36 LEVAY, supra note 16, at 123. See also J. Hall & D. Kimura, Dermatolyglyphic
Assymetry & Sexual Orientation in Men, BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 108:1203 (1994) (gay
men are more likely than non-gay men to have a greater number of ridges on the
fingerprints of their left hand than on the fingerprints of their right hand).
11 LEVAY, supra note 16, at 123.
31 Id. at 122.
39 Id. at 124.
4 Id.
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would provide compelling evidence that sexual orientation is not a
chosen or freely mutable trait.
B. A Genetic Link to Male Homosexuality
Dean Hamer, chief of the Section on Gene Structure and Regulation
at the National Cancer Institute, already has provided compelling
evidence on this point. Hamer has demonstrated a link between male
homosexuality and "DNA markers" on the X chromosome.4 1 Thus,
he has provided the most convincing evidence to date that sexual
orientation is genetically influenced.
4 2
Hamer began his work in this area by trying to determine whether
homosexuality runs in families. To do so, he charted the pedigrees or
4 See D.H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and
Male Sexual Orientation, SCIENCE 261: 321-27 (1993). Hamer describes his study in
detail, including why and how he performed the study, in HAMER & COPELAND, supra
note 35.
42 HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 35, at 20. There are numerous hypotheses for
how a gene for male homosexuality, which would seem to be disadvantageous for
reproduction, could survive in the gene pool. Hamer theorizes that the gene could
increase the reproductive rates of women who carry it, id. at 183, or, even if it has
no selective advantage, could stay in the gene pool as a result of a high rate of
mutation. Id. at 185.
Earlier evidence that heredity is at least partly causally related to male homosexuality
comes from twin studies. Because identical (monozygotic) twins share 100 percent of
their genes, while fraternal (dizygotic) twins share only 50 percent of their genes, a
trait that is genetically influenced should be shared more often by identical twins than
by fraternal twins. Id. at 28. Twin studies indicate that 50%-65% of the monozygotic
twins of gay men are themselves gay, while only 25%-30% of the dizygotic twins of
gay men are gay. See J.M. Bailey & R.C. Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual
Orientation, ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 40:1089, 1093 (1991); F. L. Whitam, M.
Diamond, J. Martin, Homosexual Orientation in Twins: A Report of 61 Pairs and Three
Triplet Sets, ARCHIVES SEX. BEHAV. 22:187 (1993). See also LEVAY, supra note 16, at
112; HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 35, at 28.
That environmental factors also influence sexual orientation (as is evidenced from
the fact that some identical twins are discordant for sexual orientation) does not
necessarily mean that family upbringing has any influence on sexual orientation. As
Hamer explains: "[U]ndergoing prenatal development in a womb swimming with male
hormones is as much an environmental factor as growing up in a devoutly religious
household." Id. at 82. See also LEVAY, supra note 16, at 113 ("[N]ongenetic factors.
can operate before birth as well as after birth .... Even identical twins do not share
an identical prenatal environment: the blood supply of one twin may be better than
the other's, for example, and this in turn may lead to a difference in the twin's birth
weights. ").
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lineages of a random sample of gay males, 43 noting the presence of
gay male relatives (uncles, brothers, cousins, etc.). 44 Hamer interviewed
both the gay men who volunteered to be in his study and, whenever
possible, their family members.4 5 He did not rely on the self-identifi-
cation (as gay or non-gay) of the men in his study. Rather, Hamer's
assessment of the subjects' sexuality was based on a one- to two-hour
structured interview covering the etiology of the subjects' sexual,
emotional and romantic attractions, fantasies and activities." In total,
Hamer collected the histories of seventy-six families by interviewing
more than a thousand relatives of seventy-six gay subjects 7. 4
Hamer hoped to find significantly elevated rates of homosexuality in
the relatives of his gay male subjects as compared to a "background
rate of male homosexuality" computed from a survey of the families
of lesbians conducted by a colleague at the National Institutes of
Health.4 Hamer did find this,4 9 but he also made an unexpected and
more telling discovery.
Upon looking at "family trees" resulting from his interviews, Hamer
noticed that gay males had far more gay male relatives on their mother's
side of the family than on their father's side of the family.5 0 Further,
Hamer found that the male maternal cousins through aunts of gay
11 HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 35, at 47-48, 78. The sample was "random"
with respect to whether the gay males had gay relatives. Id. at 47. The sample of gay
men was assembled from patients at the HIV Clinic of the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Disease, visitors to the Whitman-Walker Clinic in Washington D.C.,
clients of the Triangle Club, an organization that offers addiction counseling for gay
men and lesbians, and members of "Emergence," an organization formed by gay and
lesbian Christian Scientists. Id. at 48.
41 Id. at 20.
41 Id. at 85.
" Id. at 54-55. Hamer found that almost all of the men that he interviewed could
be classified as "definitely gay" or "definitely straight." Only three percent of the
men interviewed scored in the "bisexual" range on two or more of the four "Kinsey"
scales used (self-identification, fantasy, attraction, and behavior). Id. at 66-67. Hamer
also found that the "sexual direction" of the gay participants was evident long before
puberty evidencing "that sexual orientation is a deeply ingrained component of a
person's psychological makeup, which . . . is consistent with a genetic predisposition."
Id. at 73. Moreover, Hamer found that most of the men he interviewed had always
had the same sexual orientation and expected that it would never change. Id. at 65.
41 Id. at 89, 91.
41 Id. at 98-100. Hamer assumed that male and female homosexuality are largely
etiologically independent of each other.
49 Id. at 101-02.
-1 Id. at 20, 93.
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men were more likely to be gay than were the male maternal cousins
through uncles of gay men or than were paternal cousins (through
either paternal aunts or paternal uncles).5 1
This "sex-linked" pattern suggested to Hamer that a gene on the
X chromosome influences male homosexuality.52 Fathers always trans-
mit only their single Y chromosome to their sons (and only their single
X chromosome to their daughters) and mothers always transmit one
of their two X chromosomes to their sons (as well as to their daugh-
ters), 53 thus, X-linked traits inherited by males always are passed to
those males through the mother's side of the family.5 4 Thus, a "gay
gene" on the X chromosome would result in more gay men on the
mother's side of the family of a gay man. 55 Also, a "gay gene" on
the X chromosome would result in more gay male cousins through
maternal aunts than through maternal uncles because there is no father
to son (uncle to male cousin) transmission of the X chromosome; thus,
even maternal uncles with the "gay gene" could not pass it on to their
sons.
56
Although Hamer's family trees hinted at a "gay gene" on the X
chromosome, family environmental influences, in theory, also could
have caused the patterns he saw. 57 To prove that genes do play a role
in homosexuality, Hamer next looked directly at the DNA of gay men.
To maximize the possibility that he would uncover a "gay gene,"
Hamer utilized "genetic loading"-the notion that the best place to
search for a gene influencing a certain trait is in persons from families
in which the trait is clustered. 58 Thus, Hamer used forty pairs of gay
Id. at 95-96.
5 Id. at 20.
51 Id. at 79.
I* Id. at 95. Two well-known examples of recessive X-linked inheritance are color-
blindness and hemophilia. Id.
5 See id. at 95.
'6 Id. at 96. Of the eight types of males relatives Hamer considered (fathers,
brothers, maternal uncles, paternal uncles, maternal cousins through an aunt, maternal
cousins through an uncle, paternal cousins through an aunt, and paternal cousins
through an uncle), only brothers, maternal uncles, and maternal cousins through an
aunt had significantly elevated rates of homosexuality. Id. at 102. This suggests X
chromosome linkage as the mode of inheritance. Id. at 104. An X linked gay gene
would account for gay men having non-gay sons in the same proportion as non-gay
men. A father would never pass the "gay gene" to his son. Rather, a son's sexual
orientation would be determined by the X chromosome inherited from his mother.
11 Id. at 106.
51 Id. at 107.
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brothers in this phase of his search for the "gay gene." 59 "[G]ay
brothers served as signposts that their families were likely to have the
gene for homosexuality, if such a gene existed."
60
The method Hamer used to locate the "gay gene" is called "linkage
analysis. " 6' Linkage analysis works because genes found close to one
another on a chromosome are usually inherited together (because
strands of DNA only rarely break in two and so genes close to each
other on a certain piece of DNA are likely to travel together into the
germ cells that make up a human zygote). 62 Thus, persons who share
a gene are likely also to share a piece of DNA that is close to that
gene. 63 This principle enabled Hamer to go fishing for the location of
the "gay gene" using numerous "DNA markers" the locations of
which on the X chromosome have become known through the "Human
Genome Project. "64 To be clear, a successful marker does not cause
the trait in question, it merely is inherited along with the gene for the
trait. 65
It is important that the DNA markers Hamer used to go fishing for
the "gay gene" all came in two versions, called "alleles. "66 If both
brothers have inherited the same allele of the marker, they are con-
cordant for the marker. If the brothers have inherited different alleles
of the marker, they are discordant. 67 Hamer theorized that if a "gay
gene" exists, there would be markers close to it for which more than
half of the pairs of gay brothers were concordant (chance alone would
result in half of the pairs of gay brothers being concordant for any
DNA marker not linked to homosexuality). 68
11 Id. at 107, 110-11. Thirty-eight of these sibling pairs were found through
advertisements placed in gay-focused newspapers in Baltimore and Washington, D.C.;
two of the pairs were located through Hamer's initial survey of the families of gay
men. Id. at 49-50, 111. Upon surveying the families of these forty sibling pairs, Hamer
found the same pattern he had observed in his initial survey: the highest rates of male
homosexuality were found among maternal uncles and cousins through a maternal
aunt. Id.
6o Id. at 107.
61 Id. at 112.
62 Id. at 113.
63 Id. at 113.
' See id. at 113-14. In 1990, the U.S. government began the "Human Genome
Project." The goal of the project is to map the entire human genome. Id. at 36.
65 Id. at 114.
66 See id. at 116.
67 Id. at 116.
68 Id. at 116, 138.
HeinOnline  -- 18 U. Haw. L. Rev. 582 1996
1996 / GAY ESSENTIALISM-DETERMINISM
Hamer tested the DNA of the forty pairs of gay brothers for twenty-
two different markers found at different points on the X chromosome. 69
Hamer found that thirty-three out of the forty pairs of gay brothers
were concordant for a series of five markers in. a region of the X
chromosome known as "Xq28. '"70 The odds that this many pairs of
the gay brothers would be concordant for those DNA markers by
chance are one in ten thousand. 7
Thus, while Hamer did not isolate a "gay gene" itself, he detected
the presence of at least one such gene7 2 and he narrowed the search
for that gene to a small region of the X chromosome-Xq28."1 That
area is big enough to contain approximately 200 genes.74 Researchers
in this area expect that within the next five to fifteen years the Human
Genome Project will catalog each of them. Thus, Hamer is confident
that the "gay gene" will be found .5
In light of LeVay's findings of orientational dimorphism at the
INAH-3, Hamer hypothesizes that a "gay gene" could encode for a
protein that influences the growth or death of neurons in the INAH-
69 Id. at 138.
10 Id. at 21, 138. Hamer also found that sexual orientation was not linked to any
other region of the X chromosome. Id. at 139.
11 Id. at 137, 138. Shortly before this article went to publication, Hamer and his
co-researchers confirmed and extended the results of the study finding a link between
male homosexuality and Xq28. See Stella Hu et al., Linkage Between Sexual Orientation
and Chromosome Xq28 in Males But Not in Females, NATURE GENETICS 11: 248-256 (1995).
The 1995 study replicated in a new group of gay brothers the earlier finding that
linked male homosexuality to markers on Xq28. Id. at 249. Moreover, concordant
gay male sibling pairs were discordant with their non-gay brothers for Xq28 markers.
Id. at 249. Finally, Hamer and his research team also analyzed 36 families in which
there were two lesbian sisters. They found no linkage between Xq28 DNA markers
and female homosexuality. Id. at 251-252. Thus, Hamer and his team theorize "that
a locus at Xq28 influences sexual orientation in men but not in women." Id. at 253.
72 Hamer estimates that the gene in Xq28 influences the sexual orientation of at
most 67 percent of gay men. HAMER & COPLAND, supra note 35, at 145. Other genes
or environmental factors could influence the sexual orientation of the remaining gay
men.
11 Id. at 133, 147.
14 Id. at 147.
75 Id. at 148. For those who doubt that a single gene could influence something as
complex as sexual orientation, Hamer points out that out of the 100,000 or so genes
in every human, one, a gene that codes for the testis determining factor ("TDF"),
accounts for virtually all of the biological differences between men and women. Id. at
151. For a description of how this one gene controls the biological differentiation of
the sexes during prenatal development, see id. at 151-55.
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3 or that regulates the region by hormones.7 6 LeVay himself has
theorized that the receptors in the brain that respond to hormones may
differ between gay men and non-gay men."
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST IN HOMOSEXUAL
EROTIC ACTIVITY
The physiology and genetics findings relating to the nature of
homosexuality discussed supra, at a minimum, are compelling evidence
that sexual orientation is not a freely chosen or easily mutable trait.
We do not choose our genes. And, to date, no one has even suggested
a means for altering the relevant brain structures that are implicated
in sexual orientation.
There is reason to be optimistic (or anxious) that at least by early
in the next century science will have progressed to the point that we
will know with some certainty which genes influence sexual orientation
and how they do so.7" This knowledge is likely to alter profoundly the
dynamics of the ongoing discourse within American society on the
role-whether that of pariah or of moral and/or social equivalent-that
gay people should play in our society.7 9 It should be expected then,
that this knowledge also will affect the way that society and the courts
apply the law to gay people.
Although the connection is not immediately obvious, a careful anal-
ysis of the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence
reveals that the notion that a gay sexual orientation is involuntarily
determined and not easily mutable should impact on the scope of
protection afforded by the Due Process Clause to the physical expression
of that sexual orientation. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
76 Id. at 163. See also LEVAY, "supra note 16, at 140 (speculating that the "gay
gene" could be a gene regulating the development of the hypothalamus).
LEVAY, supra note 16, at 126.
78 HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 35, at 148, 218 (noting the rapid development
of DNA sequencing technology and expressing optimism that a "gay gene" will be
found, if necessary, by looking at every coding sequence in Xq28); LEVAY, supra note
16, at 140 (asserting that "the significance of [Hamer's genetic] finding[s] to our
understanding of sexual orientation can hardly be overestimated. Although the gene
itself has not yet been isolated and sequenced, it probably will be within a few years.
When this happens, it will be possible to ask how and when the gene works.").
" See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
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liberty, or property, without due process of law.' '80 The quest to define
the scope of the "liberty" in the Due Process Clause has generated a
controversy every bit as heated as the controversy over the nature of
homosexuality.
On its face, the Due Process Clause relates only to the procedures
that a state must use before depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property. Therefore, a sound textual argument can be made that the
Due Process Clause, although commanding that the state must provide
certain processes, provides no substantive rights against the state. Such
a Due Process Clause would allow one injured by state action to argue
that the process by which he was injured was flawed, but would not
allow a challenge under the Due Process Clause to the substance of
the legislation at issue.
For over a century, however, the Supreme Court has held that the
Due Process Clause contains also a substantive component which
provides that the infringement of certain liberties is outside the scope
of the government's authority to legislate, regardless of the procedure
involved. 81 A first subset of such impermissible legislation relates to
state action that is irrational. Thus, the Due Process Clause provides
for a liberty interest in being free from irrational legislation .
2
A second subset of impermissible state action relates to limitations
that infringe a fundamental liberty interest without sufficient justifica-
tion. The state may infringe such a fundamental liberty interest, but
only when necessary to further a compelling state interest.8 3
Given that the Supreme Court has recognized a substantive com-
ponent to the Due Process Clause, the question arises, what interests
are fundamental liberty interests? In Bowers v. Hardwick,84 a gay man
argued that Georgia's sodomy law violated his due process rights by
'0 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, S 1. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment provides that
"[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Discussion herein of "the Due Process Clause" is
intended to reference the Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
" See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887), in support of this proposition.)
82 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84
(1978).
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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infringing upon his fundamental liberty interest in engaging in consen-
sual sodomy . 5 The Court rejected this claim.
The Court reasoned that none of the privacy interests previously
pronounced to be fundamental liberty interests "b[ore] any resemblance
to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy.' '86 Specifically, the Court characterized its previously recog-
nized fundamental privacy liberty interests as relating to "family,
marriage, or procreation" and yet "[n]o connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on
the other ha[d] been demonstrated." '87
The Court expressed belated awareness that it undermines its own
legitimacy when it announces new substantive rights against the state
not grounded in the history or text of the Constitution .8s The Court
noted that
[In s]triving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not
readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than
the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States and
the Federal Government, the Court has sought to identify the nature of
the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection. In Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S. Ct. 149, 151, 152 (1937), it
was said that this category includes those fundamental liberties that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty
nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed." A different description
Id. at 188. Although the challenged law criminalized sodomy irrespective of the
genders of those engaging in the activity, see id. at 188 n.1, the Court framed "[tjhe
issue presented [a]s whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Id. at 190. The Court expressly noted that the
respondent did not challenge the sodomy statute "based on the Ninth Amendment,
the Equal Protection Clause, or the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 196 n.8.
86 Id. at 190-91. The Court cited to Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
81 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-191.
Id. at 194-95 ("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots
in the language or design of the Constitution .... There should be, therefore, great
resistance to expand the substantive reach of th[e Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments], particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself
further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.").
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of fundamental liberties appeared in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503, 97 S. Ct. 1932, 1937 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.), where
they are characterized as those liberties that are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." 8 9
Finally, pointing to historical proscriptions against sodomy, the Court
concluded "[i]t is obvious to us that neither of these formulations
would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of
consensual sodomy.'"9
The Bowers Court decided only the issue of whether the Due Process
Clause gives rise to a fundamental liberty interest to engage in con-
sensual sodomy. 9' Despite the broad language of Bowers, the issue of
whether the Due Process Clause would preclude a state from proscribing
all same-sex erotic activity, such as kissing, massage, etc., remains an
open one. 9 Arguably, this is particularly so in light of the Bowers
Court's seeming reliance on the historical prohibitions against sodomy
as controlling the issue before it because no state proscribes same-sex
kissing, hand-holding or caressing. 9 Only Missouri expressly outlaws
same-sex mutual masturbation. 94
19 Id. at 191-92.
90 Id. at 191-194.
91 The sodomy statute at issue in Bowers, Georgia Code Annotated § 16-6-2 (1984),
provided in pertinent part, as follows: "(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy
when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another ..... Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1 (quoting GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
91 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375,
380 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("[I]t is
not proper to assume generally that 'homosexual conduct . . . can be criminalized.'
There are many varieties of conduct that might be characterized as homosexual, from
hand-holding to sodomy. Hardwick establishes only that the latter may be criminalized."
(citation omitted)); High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Sec. Clearance Office, 668
F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("The Supreme Court in Hardwick simply did
not address the issue of all homosexual activity."), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.
1990).
" See High Tech Gays, 668 F. Supp. at 1371-72; State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508,
514 (Mo. 1986) (Blackmar, J. dissenting) (rationale of Bowers does not extend to same-
sex sexual activity that has not traditionally been proscribed). See also EDITORS OF THE
HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 15 (1989) ("[Given its
reliance on history, Hardwick should not extend beyond its facts to apply to other types
of same-sex sexual activity that have not been the subject of historical prohibitions.").
14 Missouri criminalizes "any [same-sex] sexual act involving the genitals of one
person and the mouth, tongue, hand or anus of another person." Mo. ANN. STAT.
S 566.010, 566.090 (Vernon 1982).
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The instant discussion relating to whether the Due Process Clause
should today be found to protect a fundamental right to engage in at
least some same-sex erotic activity starts from the premise that, as an
original matter, those decisions that have ascribed a substantive com-
ponent to the Due Process Clause are in error.9 5 The text of the
Constitution says nothing of substantive due process rights, and the
histories of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide no clear
support for the proposition that the framers intended for the Due
Process Clause to afford any substantive protections, let alone provide
guidance as to which substantive protections it should afford.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court is not likely anytime soon to retreat
from the view that certain due process liberty interests are funda-
mental. 96 In Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey,97 the Supreme
Court reexamined the holding of Roe v. Wade,9" which recognized a
substantive due process right to have an abortion. Without ever stating
that Roe was correctly decided as an original matter, the Court reaf-
firmed "the essential holding" of Roe. 99
The Court explained that "when [it] reexamines a prior holding, its
judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and prag-
matic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case." 100 The
" See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring) ("If
... the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union,
shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitutional power, the Court
cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to
the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed
standard: the ablest and purest of men have differed upon the subject; and all that
the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature
(possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of
the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice."); TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2727 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (rejecting the proposition that the due process clause "is the secret
repository of all sorts of . . .unenumerated [substantive] rights."). See also Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 8-11 (1971).
9 See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(reaffirming, largely on stare decisis grounds, a woman's fundamental liberty interest
in aborting her fetus without undue interference from the state).
9, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46.
100 Id. at 854.
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Court found the "cost" of overruling Roe to be too high. The Court
concluded that overruling a constitutional interpretation such as that
in Roe in reliance upon which "for two decades of economic and social
developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made
choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society,"
especially in light of the "political pressure" to overrule Roe's holding,
would do "both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court's
legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law."'' 1
This stare decisis analysis applies a fortiori to substantive due process
in general.
Thus, the question remains-what interests are fundamental liberty
interests? Bowers suggests that only those privacy interests "that are
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" can be funda-
mental liberty interests. 10 2 Bowers is sharply at odds, however, with the
cases that preceded it.
Because the text and the history of the Due Process Clause can
provide little guidance to courts on how to give meaning to the term
"liberty," the Supreme Court has used tradition as a guide for its
decisions and to limit the discretion of the judiciary. 10 3 Tradition,
however, is not an element of liberty.'0 4 Rather, because society is
likely to have protected those interests that are fundamental, tradition
is a signpost for liberty. In other words, tradition correlates (imperfectly)
with liberty.10 5
'0' Id. at 856, 869. See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,
2116 (1995) ("Casey explained how considerations of stare decisis inform the decision
whether to overrule a long-established precedent that has become integrated into the
fabric of the law. Overruling precedent of that kind naturally may have consequences
for 'the ideal of the rule of law."') (citation omitted).
102 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
03 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-22 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).
'04 See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1161, 1171 (1988)
("Tradition has not been and should not be the exclusive focus of the Court's due
process jurisprudence. ").
105 See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 40 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (with respect to procedural due process, "[h]istorical acceptance of legal
institutions serves to validate them not because history provides the most convenient
rule of decision but because we have confidence that a long-accepted legal institution
would not have survived if it rested upon procedures found to be either irrational or
unfair").
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Support for this thesis is found in the seminal privacy cases that do
not mention tradition as a required element of liberty. 10 6 Further, one
of the earliest in-depth discussions of tradition in the privacy area
indicates that tradition was meant only as a limitation on judicial
discretion. In Griswold v. Connecticut,107 the Court held that a law
forbidding the use of contraceptives intruded upon the right of marital
privacy. 0 8 In response to the dissent's expressed fear that, lacking any
textual limitations, Justices would use their private notions of right
and wrong in deciding cases in this area, Justice Goldberg, concurring,
wrote that the Justices must look for guidance to the "traditions and
(collective) conscience of our people" to determine if an interest is
fundamental. 1' 9 Similarly, Justice Harlan, concurring, stated that re-
spect for the teachings of history and the values that underlie our
society will keep "judges from roaming at large in the constitutional
field[.T],,' 0
Moreover, in practice, the Court has recognized a fundamental right
to do certain things that society not only has not protected, but has
criminalized. In Loving v. Virginia,"' the Court struck down a Virginia
prohibition on interracial marriage as violative of the fundamental right
to marry."' This despite the Court's expressed awareness of the fact
that miscegenation had been banned in Virginia since colonial times." 3
At the time of the Loving decision, sixteen states banned interracial
marriage." 4 Fourteen other states had only recently repealed their
prohibitions within the preceding fifteen years."11 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,"16
106 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (the right of an instructor to
teach a foreign language, and the right of a parent to engage the teacher to so instruct
his child, are within the liberty of the fourteenth amendment); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,' 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (statute requiring child's attendance at public
school-thus, not allowing child's attendance at.private school-deprived parents of
their right to direct the upbringing of their children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (sterilization of certain habitual criminals violated their "right to have
offspring," which was "among the basic civil rights of man").
107 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
,01 Id. at 485-86.
,09 Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
110 Id. at 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12.
"z Id. at 6.
114 Id.
1I Id. at 6 n.5.
116 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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the Court held that a prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives
violated the right of privacy." 7 Many states, however, traditionally had
banned the distribution of contraceptives. 1 8 Finally, in Roe v. Wade," 9
the Court held that a law prohibiting abortions at any stage of a
woman's pregnancy violated the right to privacy. 12 0 As Justice Rehn-
quist correctly pointed out in dissent, however, a majority of the states
had placed restrictions on abortion for more than a century. 2 ' In light
of these cases, tradition cannot be properly regarded as an element of
liberty. 22 Rather, tradition is merely an asserted limitation on discre-
tion.
Yet Bowers, in which arguably tradition alone controlled the Court's
decision on whether the Due Process Clause provides a fundamental
right to engage in sodomy, speaks loudest to the issue of whether that
clause provides a fundamental right to engage in at least some same-
sex erotic activity because of the great similarity of the nature of the
interests at issue. To the extent that Bowers does hold that a tradition
of protection is a prerequisite to recognition of a fundamental liberty
interest in this area, Bowers should be followed only if it is "intrinsically
sounder" than those privacy cases that have not found tradition to be
a controlling factor lest the Court "compound [its] recent error and
... make [an] unjustified break from previously established doctrine
complete." 23
"I Id. at 453 ("If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
I" See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554-55 & n.16 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing
also to the laws of Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, and Spain forbidding or otherwise
regulating the distribution of contraceptives).
",, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
120 Id. at 153.
21 Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (with respect to whether an interest has traditionally been protected by our
society, "[t]he protection need not take the form of an explicit constitutional provision
or statutory guarantee, but it must at least exclude . . . a societal tradition of enacting
laws denying the interest").
122 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2115 (1995) ("Remaining
true to an 'intrinsically sounder' doctrine established in prior cases better serves the
values of stare decisis than would following a more recently decided case inconsistent
with the decisions that came before it. ) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
In reexamining a prior holding, the Court also looks to whether that holding's
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The Bowers Court trumpeted tradition as a restraint on the judiciary,
lest judges be tempted to impose their own values on the state and
federal governments when defining "liberty. ' 12 4 Thus, whether, for
the purposes of the instant discussion, Bowers is "intrinsically sounder"
than the privacy cases that came before it, is a function of the merits
of tradition as a judicial restraint.1 25 In practice, reference to tradition
in defining liberty is unworkable; thus, its use will not lead to pre-
dictable or reproducible results. Any claimed judicial restraint through
the use of tradition, therefore, is illusory, and tradition fails on the
very grounds that supposedly justify its use.1 26
First, the use of tradition does not allow a court to evade the original
question-"what is liberty?" It cannot be asserted seriously that "lib-
erty" includes all interests that society traditionally has protected. For
example, the government has in recent years "protected" the right of
home owners to deduct the interest on their mortgage. Yet, the Supreme
Court is not likely to hold that the home mortgage interest deduction
is a fundamental liberty interest. Indeed, since the 1930's, the Supreme
Court has refused to recognize fundamental rights in the economic
sphere.1 27 Thus, after determining that an asserted interest is one that
society traditionally has protected, a court still must ask whether the
factual underpinning has changed or has "come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of . . . justification." Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992). As discussed infra the physiology and genetics
findings discussed in part I, supra, call into question the factual underpinning of Bowers
that "[n]o connection [exists] between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other." Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186, 191
(1986). This provides a second arguable justification for not following Bowers in this
area, and, indeed, for overruling Bowers.
'24 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
25 For a broader criticism of the overreliance on tradition in substantive due process
analysis, see E. Gary Spitko, Note, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia's Approach to
Fundamental Rights Adjudication, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337 (1991).
126 See generally id., at 1348-52.
'27 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S 502, 537 (1934) ("So far as the requirement
of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a
state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose.");
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-98 (1937); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) ("[W]e emphatically refuse to go back to the time when
courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought."') (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
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interest is fundamental without reference to tradition. Tradition only
limits the set of possible "liberties."
But does it? Arguably, "tradition" is no less illusory a concept than
is "liberty." To agree on a common workable definition of "tradition"
is no mean feat. Bowers itself illustrates well that giving meaning to
"tradition" necessarily involves subjective, value-laden decisions. In
Bowers, Justice White's opinion for the Court cited to the common law
prohibition on sodomy, the fact that at one time all fifty states outlawed
sodomy, and that, as he wrote his opinion in 1986, twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia continued to outlaw at least same-sex
sodomy, as evidence of a societal tradition disapproving same-sex
sodomy. 28 By 1986, however, twenty-three states had repealed their
prohibitions on sodomy 2 9 and the high courts of New York and
Pennsylvania had struck down sodomy restrictions as violative of the
right to privacy and equal protection respectively. 130 How is a judge
to decide whether this evidences a new tradition respecting a liberty
to engage in sodomy? At what point does modern protection of an
interest take precedence over historical proscriptions? 3 '
Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Bowers raises the converse of
this question. Justice Burger cited, inter alia, to the fact that
"[h]omosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law," spe-
cifically the Justinian Code, to support his conclusion that participation
128 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94.
29 See Survey on the Law, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526-27 (1986).
130 See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (statute criminalizing adult
consensual sodomy violates, inter alia, the right to privacy in the New York constitution);
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980) (statute criminalizing sodomy
outside of marriage "exceeds the valid bounds of the police power while infringing
the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States and of th[e] Commonwealth" of Pennsylvania).
Since 1986, Nevada, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania have repealed their
restrictions on sodomy. Also, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that Kentucky's
prohibition of sodomy violated the right to privacy and the guarantee of equal protection
provided for in the Kentucky constitution. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d
487, 491-92 (Ky. 1992).
1' See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 138 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the plurality's overreliance on tradition in defining "liberty" by noting
that such an approach assumed the Court's ability "to identify the point at which a
tradition becomes firm enough to be relevant to our definition of liberty and the
moment at which it becomes too obsolete to be relevant any longer").
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in sodomy was not a fundamental liberty interest.132 Gay sex was not
proscribed, however, during the Roman Republic nor during the early
days of the Roman Empire.'3 3 Should such a pre-Justinian "tradition"
of respect for the individual's right to practice homosexual sodomy
enter into a court's liberty calculus? If so, what weight should it be
given?
Moving on, and assuming arguendo that jurists could settle on a
reproducible working definition of tradition, even greater uncertainty
arises when one tries to understand the traditions of past societies and
apply that understanding to contemporary cases. This uncertainty arises
from the fact that the content of a tradition cannot be understood apart
from the societal context in which it arose. 34 Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald, D. 35 demonstrates this difficulty.
In Michael H., a putative biological father, Michael H., asserted a
substantive liberty interest in continuing his relationship with his
putative daughter who had been conceived and born while her mother
was married to another man. 3 6 Justice Scalia focused on the common
law presumption of legitimacy- providing that a newborn child is
presumed to be the biological child of the mother's husband-and
concluded that "our traditions have protected the marital family ([the
mother, her husband], and the child they acknowledge to be theirs)
against the" claims of adulterous fathers. 137
The presumption of legitimacy, however, could be rebutted at com-
mon law by proof that the husband was impotent, sterile, or had no
access to his wife during the period of the child's conception.138 Ar-
guably, this allowance for rebuttal of the presumption evinces a "tra-
dition" allowing for an adulterous father to prove his paternity whenever
there existed compelling evidence that the husband was not the child's
"I Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
133 JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY
PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY, 68-71 (1980) (the first Roman legal restrictions "against
homosexual behavior can be dated precisely to the third century A.D." Moreover,
homosexual relations were not categorically prohibited by Roman law until the sixth
century.).
"I See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 797 (1983).
" 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
,16 Id. at 113-14, 121.
3I Id. at 124.
138 Id.
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father. Thus, the question arises-what would the society that gave
rise to the presumption of legitimacy, a society which did not know
blood tests, have done in the face of a blood test showing a 98.07%
certainty that Michael H. was the father of the child he claimed as his
own? 3 9
The presumption of legitimacy might not reflect a tradition preferring
the marital family over the parental relationship, but might merely be
a recognition that a child born to a marriage is most often a child of
the marriage. We cannot know with certainty. Moreover, to ask the
question itself seems to be an unnecessary distraction from the original
issue-whether the interest Michael H. has in the continuation of his
relationship with his putative daughter is an interest for which the Due
Process Clause should provide substantive protection- because the
answer tells us nothing about the nature of the relationship between
Michael H. and his daughter.'4
Thus, because judges remain free to choose their own definition of
"tradition" and because we are sure to disagree as to the meanings
that our forebears attached to their actions, tradition is an unsuitable
guide for defining liberty and an unworkable judicial restraint. The
Bowers rationale is intrinsically unsound, therefore, and should not be
followed. Moreover, we need no longer fear that "judges [will be left]
roaming at large in the constitutional field' ' 4 ' even were courts to
abandon reference to tradition in substantive due process adjudication
altogether. Having set forth in the last sixty years an ample body of
case law giving meaning to "liberty" within the privacy sphere of the
Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court is better able to distill directly
from those cases the principles that speak to the definition of liberty.
' A test of Michael H.'s blood indicated a 98.07% probability that he was the
biological father of his putative daughter. Id. at 114. See Sunstein, supra note 104, at
1173 ("[T]radition cannot by itself be controlling in close cases, and the constitutional
question must be answered instead by an inescapably normative inquiry into how the
relevant tradition is best characterized."). See also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan,
J. dissenting) (noting that the blood test to determine paternity was not available at
the time that the presumption of legitimacy arose).
" Whether or not society traditionally has protected an asserted liberty speaks not
to the nature of the asserted liberty, but rather to the interest society has in infringing
that asserted liberty. Thus, tradition analysis conflates the question-is there a liberty
interest-with the question-what is the state's interest in infringing the liberty interest.
See id. at 146-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, at 501-02 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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This is particularly so in light of the previously stated premise of the
instant discussion-that as an original matter all substantive due process
adjudication is illegitimate, and its continued application is justified
only by prudential concerns grounded in stare decisis.
The recent joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey 42 elucidated well
enough these principles that speak to the definition of liberty.
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rear-
ing, and education .... These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.143
The Court would do well to abandon its pretense that substantive due
process is somehow legitimated through the use of tradition as a
limitation on the personal predilections of the judiciary and instead be
guided by these principles derived from the privacy case law.
Application of these principles to the issue at hand gives rise to the
question whether same-sex erotic activity relates to family relationships
or "involv[es] the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy."
The physiology and genetics findings set forth supra in Part 1I, at a
minimum, militate in favor of an affirmative answer to both of these
unavoidably subjective questions.'"
The science is pertinent because it informs the voluntarism/deter-
minism debate. Determinists believe that by some means, whether
nature or the environment, sexual orientation is given to an individual
and cannot be changed. Voluntarists argue that an individual is free
to voluntarily choose his sexual orientation or can choose to change it
without difficulty. 145 The science evinces that gay people do not choose
14 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
"' Id. at 852. See also id. at 852 (stating that a woman's suffering in giving birth to
a child "is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its
own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course
of our history and our culture").
'4 Whether decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, [non-gay]
family relationships, child-rearing, and education are "central to personal dignity and
autonomy" is no less subjective a question.
M' See Ortiz, supra, note 14, at 1837 (defining the nature/nurture and determinism/
voluntarism debates and distinguishing the two).
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their sexual desires. It evinces that same-sex erotic activity is not merely
"aberrant activity, either on the part of heterosexuals intent on sub-
verting traditional society or by people who are prey to psychological,
emotional or sexual dysfunction" 1 6 but, rather, is the "natural' '1 41
expression of a genetically influenced organization of the brain resulting
in an enduring predisposition toward an erotic, affectional, and ro-
mantic attraction to individuals of one's own sex that exists independent
of any physical sexual act. 148
Given that a gay person cannot choose to be non-gay-to redirect
his erotic, affectional and romantic desires-but can only choose whether
or not to act on those desires, then the decision to engage in same-sex
erotic activity would surely seem to be among "the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime.' ' 4 9 The decision to
express a same-sex attraction, to remain celibate, or to have an
"intimate" opposite-sex relationship without the possibility of satisfying
intimacy profoundly impacts the decision-maker's self-identity, happi-
ness, "personal dignity and autonomy" and is commensurate with
such other deeply personal, and constitutionally protected, decisions
relating to family, marriage, and procreation. Thus, the Due Process
Clause, as the Supreme Court has given it substance, should protect
this choice. '5 0
146 Sullivan, supra note 9, at 24.
"47 The notion that homosexual sex is "unnatural" frequently is cited as a justifi-
cation for discrimination against gay people. See Debbie Howlett, Lesbian Ruling Stirs
Fury, Praise, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1993, at 3A (quoting Anne Kincaid, of the Family
Foundation, asserting that gay "sexual behaviors . . .are against the laws of nature"
and applauding a Virginia court's removal of a two year old boy from his lesbian
mother's custody on the ground that she was in a lesbian relationship).
I" See Herek, supra note 11; Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. Cincinnati,
860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (citing psychologist Dr. John Gonsiorek's
testimony that sexual orientation is "a predisposition toward erotic, sexual, affiliation
or affection relationship towards one's own and/or the other gender"), rev'd, 54 F.3d
261 (6th Cir. 1995).
- See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (1st ed. 1978)
(arguing that same-sex sodomy is "central to the personalities of those singled out
by" prohibitions on such activity).
110 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361,
1370, 1372 (holding that the Due Process Clause protects the right of gay people to
engage in at least some same-sex erotic activity "because this aspect of life occupies
such an important part of all human beings' lives") (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d
563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990).
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IV. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY FOR CLASSIFICATIONS BASED
ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The physiology and genetics research relating to homosexuality also
has implications for equal protection analysis of sexual orientation
classifications. When Hamer published his study linking Xq28 to male
homosexuality, some gay legal activists theorized that Hamer's finding
would lead to heightened judicial scrutiny of sexual orientation classi-
fications because it advanced the argument that sexual orientation is
immutable. 5 ' A careful analysis of the Supreme Court's equal protec-
tion jurisprudence reveals, however, that immutability of a character-
istic is neither a prerequisite to nor a sufficient condition for heightened
scrutiny of a classification relating to that characteristic. The science
is still pertinent, however, not for what is says about the immutability
of a gay sexual orientation, but simply because it evinces that a gay
sexual orientation necessarily connotes nothing more than a same-sex
desire and, thus, it undermines the notion that homosexuality cannot
exist apart from homosexual sexual conduct-a notion that repeatedly
has precluded heightened scrutiny for classifications that discriminate
against gay people as gay people.
A court reviewing the constitutionality of a governmental classifica-
tion applies one of three levels of scrutiny: "strict," "intermediate,"
or "rational basis.' '152 A classification that infringes upon a fundamental
right or that is "suspect" is reviewed with strict scrutiny to determine
if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 53
A classification that is "quasi-suspect" is reviewed with intermediate
scrutiny and is constitutional only if it is substantially related to an
important governmental interest. 54 Finally, a court reviews for a
rational basis a government classification that is neither suspect nor
quasi-suspect and that does not infringe upon a fundamental right.
55
Under the "rational basis" test, a classification will be found consti-
tutional if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. 
56
The judiciary's expressed justification for subjecting some legislative
classifications, but not others, to "heightened scrutiny" derives from
'5' See, e.g., HAMER & COPELAND supra note 35, at 22, 210-11.
152 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
See id. at 429-30.
1514 See id. at 430.
155 See id. at 440.
156 See id.
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"the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official
sources in the States. This strong policy renders racial classifications
'constitutionally suspect' . . . and 'in most circumstances irrelevant' to
any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose."'5 7 Thus, classifi-
cations based upon race and national origin, which the Supreme Court
in this context has treated as interchangeable with race, 15 are "suspect"
and deserving of heightened scrutiny by the courts.
In addition to race and national origin, the Supreme Court has
recognized alienage as a suspect classification, except for when such a
classification differentiates between aliens and citizens with respect to
"government functions. ' 159 Also, the Supreme Court has recognized
gender as a quasi-suspect classification. 160 Finally, the Supreme Court
has subjected classifications that discriminate on the basis of illegitimacy
to a "somewhat heightened" standard of scrutiny.' 6'
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
158 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between
citizens solely on the basis of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. For that reason,
legislative classifications . . . based on race alone ha[ve] often been held to be a denial
of equal protection." (citing to two cases that addressed classifications that discriminated
against persons of Chinese descent and one case that addressed a classification that
discriminated against black people)); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (noting with respect to a classification that placed limitations upon persons
because of their Japanese ancestry that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.").
' See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("Aliens as a class are a
prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority . . . for whom . . . heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate."). Compare with Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
72-75 (1979) (explicating a "governmental functions" exception to the general standard
of heightened scrutiny applicable to classifications based on alienage).
160 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (plurality opinion an-
nouncing a strict scrutiny standard); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)
(announcing an intermediate standard).
"I' See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (illegitimacy is not a suspect
classification); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) ("As we recognized in
Lucas, illegitimacy is analogous in many respects to the personal characteristics that
have been held to be suspect when used as the basis of statutory differentiations ....
We nevertheless concluded that the analogy was not sufficient to require 'our most
exacting scrutiny.' . . . Despite the conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy
fall in a 'realm of less than strictest scrutiny,' ... Lucas also establishes that the
scrutiny 'is not a toothless one."').
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In arriving at these ends, however, the Supreme Court has failed to
articulate cogently its means for determining whether a classification
other than race or national origin deserves heightened scrutiny. 162 At
various times, the Supreme Court, in adjudicating this issue, has
expressly mentioned each of the following factors as potentially relevant:
(1) whether the classification historically has been used to discriminate
against a group classified thereunder; 6 3 (2) whether the classification
is informative as to any given individual's intrinsic ability to participate
in or contribute to society' 6 and similarly whether the classification
has been used to "saddle[] with disabilities" on the basis of prejudice
or inaccurate stereotypes members of a group classified thereunder; 65
(3) whether the classification relates to a characteristic that is immu-
table, 66 or similarly relates to a characteristic that is not within an
individual's control; 67 and (4) whether members of a group classified
under such a classification have been "relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process.'" 8 The Supreme Court, however,
has never required all of these factors for a classification to be suspect. 169
One can view the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of the
law as an attempt to determine whether asserted suspect classifications
162 See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Except in the area of
the law in which the Framers obviously meant it to apply-classifications based on
race or national origin, the first cousin of race-the Court's decisions can fairly be
described as an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a series of conclusions
unsupported by any central guiding principle."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
n. 14 (1982) ("Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications
as 'suspect.'').
163 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 313 (1976); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
" Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-444; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686; Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 310-11, 315.
65 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28 (1973); see also Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-85; Murgia,
427 U.S. at 313.
'6' See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686; see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42; Plyler, 457
U.S. at 220.
,67 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217
n.14 ("Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of
circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of 'class or caste' treatment that
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.").
168 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28; see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17 n.14.
,69 See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17 & n.1 4 .
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are sufficiently similar to race and national origin to merit heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 7 ' More particularly, the
cases can be read to support the thesis that the Supreme Court has
merely generalized the rationale of McLaughlin:' a classification, like
race, that historically has been used to saddle certain people with
disabilities on the basis of a characteristic that otherwise would be
irrelevant to an individual's ability to contribute to society is inherently
suspect as more likely to have been the product of irrational prejudice,
and thus, is deserving of heightened equal protection scrutiny.'72 Seen
in this light, the cases reveal that the criteria relating to "immutability"
and "political powerlessness" are neither necessary nor even significant
factors in the suspect classification analysis.' 73
That a classification relates to an immutable characteristic over which
an individual has no control does not alone merit heightened scrutiny
of that classification. '14 Nor is a relationship to such a characteristic a
prerequisite for heightened scrutiny. 75 The Supreme Court repeatedly
70 See Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1023, 1065 (1979) ("[T]he Supreme Court has moved beyond the original
understanding of the equal protection clause ...by broadening the category of groups
protected by equal protection, distilling from the principle of the moral irrelevance of
race the more general principle of the moral irrelevance of any trait that reveals
nothing about the moral worth or desert of a person.")
7I See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
172 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)
("[W]hat differentiates [a suspect classification] from a nonsuspect [classification] ...
is that the [suspect classification] frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society."); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n. 14 ("[Such] classifications are more
likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in
pursuit of some legitimate objective." (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973)). See also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (classifications grounded "on factors
... so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that [they
are] deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy... [toward] the burdened class," are
suspect).
7I Compare Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp.
417, 434-35 (S.D. Ohio 1994) ("Evidently, the most decisive factors the Supreme
Court has considered . . . are whether the group's defining characteristic is at all
related to its members' ability to participate in or contribute to society . . . and
whether the characteristic is beyond the individual's control") (citations omitted), revd,
54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
114 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (holding that the mentally challenged are not a
suspect class); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(stating that the elderly are not a suspect class).
175 See Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991) ("[A]bsolute
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has omitted immutability in setting forth the characteristics of a suspect
classification. 17 6 Further, the Court has held that classifications relating
to alienage are suspect even though alienage is a condition that is both
voluntarily assumed and mutable.177 Thus, whether sexual orientation
is innate and immutable or voluntarily chosen should not control the
issue of heightened scrutiny for classifications that discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation. 7 8
immutability simply is not a prerequisite for suspect classification."), rev'd on other
grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993); see also
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1073, 1074 n.51 & n.52 (1980) (immutability is "neither sufficient
nor necessary"; "even if race or gender became readily mutable by biomedical means,
... laws burdening those who choose to remain black or female would properly
remain constitutionally suspect").
176 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41; Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313; San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
192 (1964); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
177 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
See also Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat Me Not to Leave Thee": Bottoms v. Bottoms
and the Custody Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS
JOURNAL 289, 311 n.81 (1994) (arguing that even if gays and lesbians could readily
change their sexual orientation, courts should not "apply an immutability theory to
preclude suspect class status for sexual orientation" since "persons of minority sexual
orientation have significant social or cultural bonds to one another that derive affir-
matively, not just as a matter of defensive necessity, from their defining characteristic";
thus, denial of suspect class status premised on an immutability theory would implicate
important intimate and expressive associational interests). But see High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding that "[h]omosexuality is not an immutable characteristic" and holding that
homosexuality is not a suspect classification); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d
1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990).
The physiology and genetics research discussed in Part II, supra, speaks, although
not conclusively, to the immutability criterion. That a region of the brain that plays
a key role in sex is orientationally dimorphic strongly suggests that sexual orientation
is fixed as the brain develops prenatally. See supra part II.A. Nevertheless, the possibility
that such dimorphism results from rather than precedes certain sexual behavior cannot
yet be excluded. See supra part II.A. Hamer's demonstration of a link between male
homosexuality and DNA markers on the X chromosome is compelling evidence that
sexual orientation is genetically influenced but also shows that sexual orientation is
not wholly determined by genetics. See supra part II.B. See also HAMER & COPELAND,
supra note 35, at 211.
Both Hamer and LeVay have testified with respect to the nature and origins of
sexual orientation in litigation in which the appropriate level of scrutiny for sexual
orientation classifications was at issue. See id. at 210-11 (discussing Hamer's testimony
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"Political powerlessness" is central to "process" theories of equal
protection which see heightened scrutiny as a means of protecting those
who cannot fend for themselves in the political process. 179 A critique
of the merits of such theories is beyond the scope of the present
discussion. It should suffice to note that the recognition of gender as
a classification meriting heightened scrutiny suggests that this criterion
is either an inclusive one, rather than an exclusive one, or else the
criterion is so broad as to be almost meaningless. Regardless, if women,
who constitute a majority of the voting-age population in our democ-
racy, fit under the umbrella of the "politically powerless" then that
umbrella must be big enough to cover gay people also.180
in Evans v. Romer, 92-CV-7223 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), that there is a
greater than 99% probability that sexual orientation is genetically influenced in some
men); Thomasson v. Perry, Civ. A. No. 95-252-A (E.D. Va. June 8, 1995) (plaintiff's
summary judgment brief, LeVay Del. (exhibit 0)) (LeVay testifying that "[g]enes
alone are responsible for approximately one-half of the causation of a person's
orientation as homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual," LeVay Decl. at 42, and that
to the extent that sexual orientation is not influenced by genes alone, it appears to be
influenced "by biological processes occurring before birth and/or "within the first one
or two years of life." LeVay Decl. at 7-8).
In Evans v. Romer, the court, which referred to Hamer in its opinion as a "genetic
explorer," Evans, 92-CV-7223, slip op. at 13, cited to Hamer's testimony in finding
that "the preponderance of the credible evidence suggests that there is a biological or
genetic "component" of sexual orientation ...... Id. slip op. at 14. Nevertheless,
the court made no determination on the immutability issue. Id. Rather, the court held
that no adequate showing had been made that gay people were "vulnerable or politically
powerless and [thus,] in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process' in today's society." Id. slip op. at 14-15.
In Thomasson v. Perry, the district court rejected the argument of a gay naval
lieutenant that sexual orientation classifications deserved heightened scrutiny. The
Court concluded that "[blecause the government is free to criminalize homosexual
conduct, . . . 'a group that is defined by reference to that conduct cannot constitute
a 'suspect class."" Thomasson, Civ. A. No. 95-252-A, slip op. at 16 (quoting Steffan
v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). This reasoning is critiqued extensively
infra.
"I See Tribe, supra note 175, at 1073 (1980); Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument
for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosex-
uality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 828-30 (1984) (arguing that homosexuality classifications
merit heightened scrutiny because gay people "are a political minority and victims of
the majoritarian system").
"So See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (in comparison
to black people who "are protected by three federal constitutional amendments, [seven
extant] major federal Civil Rights Acts . . . , as well as antidiscrimination laws in 48
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Far more controlling in the heightened scrutiny analysis is whether
a classification is informative as to an individual's intrinsic ability to
contribute to society. A classification that is helpful in separating
individuals as to their intrinsic ability to function in society will not
merit heightened scrutiny.""i The Supreme Court has held that classi-
fications with respect to the mentally challenged are not suspect or
quasi-suspect, in part because the mentally challenged "have a reduced
ability to cope with and function in the everyday world.''182 Similarly,
the Court has refused to apply heightened scrutiny to classifications
based on age, in part since "there is a general relationship between
advancing age and decreasing physical ability." 83 Most telling is the
of the states, . . . and by absolute standards as well, homosexuals are politically
powerless"); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (gay people lack
the political power necessary to obtain redress for discrimination), vacated and aff'd on
other grounds, 875 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957
(1990); Equality Foundation of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437-39
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (citing to evidence that "of the total of 497,155 elected officials in
the United States, a total of 73 are openly gay" and concluding that gay people "are
sufficiently politically powerless"), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995);
Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1549-50 (D. Kansas 1991) (concluding that gay
people are unable to protect their rights through the political process), rev'd on other
grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993); High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(because of discrimination, gay people have been unable to secure a "politically viable
voice"), rev'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
But see High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 (citing to the passage of anti-discrimination
legislation and concluding that gay people "are not without political power"); Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing only to a magazine
report that "one congressman is an avowed homosexual, and that there is a charge
that five other top officials are known to be homosexual" and to the fact that the
mayor of Chicago had marched in a gay pride parade and concluding that "[h]omosexuals
are not without political power"); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991)
(citing inter alia to the fact that the mayor of New York had marched with gay
marchers in the St. Patrick's Day Parade and concluding that gay people are not
politically powerless); Evans, 92-CV-7223, slip op. at 14-15 (holding that no adequate
showing had been made that homosexuals were "vulnerable or politically powerless
and [thus,] in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process'
in today's society").
"I' See Sunstein, supra note 104 , at 1177 (1988) ("As the defining case of blacks
reveals, the question whether a group deserves special solicitude under the Equal
Protection Clause depends on an inescapably normative inquiry into the legitimacy of
the reasons ordinarily used to disadvantage that group.")
82 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1976)
(internal quotations omitted).
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Court's treatment of classifications based on alienage. The Court has
held a classification based on alienage merits heightened scrutiny 184
unless the classification relates to a governmental function.' 85 Such a
classification relating to a governmental function is not inherently
suspect because "[t]he distinction between citizens and aliens, though
ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fundamental to the definition
and government of a State. The Constitution itself refers to the
distinction no less than 11 times ... indicating that the status of
citizenship was meant to have significance in the structure of our
government. "1'86 It is this relevance to legitimate governmental functions
that renders heightened scrutiny inappropriate for such classifications.
A number of courts have held that sexual orientation "bears no
relationship whatsoever" to an individual's ability to function in and
contribute to society. 18 7 Given that, as the physiology and genetics
research discussed supra in Part II suggests, homosexuality is an en-
during predisposition toward an erotic, affectional, and romantic at-
traction to individuals of one's own sex, 88 however, one cannot dismiss
out of hand the argument that homosexuality does speak to a gay
person's ability to provide the most suitable home to a child-arguably
one of the greatest contributions an individual can make to society.
Lacking a romantic or erotic attraction to persons of the other sex,
seemingly would handicap a gay person, relative to a non-gay person,
in maintaining a long-term co-parenting relationship with a person of
the other sex. Thus, to the extent that one believes that a child is best
raised in one stable household with both a mother and a father, sexual
orientation arguably is highly relevant to an individual's ability to
contribute to society.18 9
184 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
85 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979).
186 Id.
117 Equality Foundation of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D.
Ohio 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). See also Watkins v.
U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1346 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Jantz v. Muci,
759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kansas 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-70 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 895 F.2d
563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990).
"8 See Herek, supra note 11.
,89 Recent findings in biopsychology point to other, less significant, indications that
gay men, as a whole, are differently-abled than non-gay men. Non-gay men, as a
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Finally, the Supreme Court has required a history of significant
"purposeful unequal treatment" as a prerequisite to heightened scru-
tiny, most likely to ensure that the judiciary does not unnecessarily
interfere with the right of the majority to legislate as it sees fit. 190 In
Mathews v. Lucas, 9' the Court concluded that the status of illegitimacy,
like race, is irrelevant to an individual's ability to contribute to
society. 92 The Court also noted that "the law has long placed the
illegitimate child in an inferior position relative to the legitimate in
certain circumstances."1 93 But because "this discrimination against
illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the
historic legal and political discrimination against women and [black
people]," the Court declined to afford strict scrutiny to such a classi-
fication. 94 The Court, however, has examined classifications based on
illegitimacy for more than just a rational basis. 95 For the purposes of
group, outperform gay men, as a group, on some tasks requiring spatial or visuospatial
skills. LEVAY, supra note 16, at 99, 117-18. For example, non-gay men, as a group,
are better at "mental rotation" when they are shown different views of a complex
object and are asked to determine if the views are of the same object. Id. The same
result holds true for the "water-level" test which requires the subject to mark the
imagined surface level of water in an illustration of a tilted flask. Id. at 100, 117-18.
Women tend to perform similar to or even worse than gay men on these tasks. Id.
at 99-100, 117-18. One study found that 92% of men but only 28% of women
correctly drew the surface level in the "water-level" test as horizontal. Id. at 100.
Thus, given that gender is a quasi-suspect classification, the finding that gay men and
non-gay men differ in visuospatial ability should not of itself influence the heightened
scrutiny analysis for sexual orientation classifications.
19 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(rejecting heightened scrutiny for classifications based on age, in part because the
elderly "have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment'); Lyng v.
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (same with respect to classifications based on
familial relatedness); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973) (same with respect to classifications based on wealth); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion noting a "long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination" and concluding that gender is a suspect classification); see also
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985) (noting
that legislators have recently been addressing the problems of the mentally challenged
"in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding
need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary").
19, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
192 Id. at 505.
193 Id. at 505-06.
, Id. at 506.
195 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (Despite the conclusion that
classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a 'realm of less than strictest scrutiny,' .
Lucas also establishes that the scrutiny 'is not a toothless one."').
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the present discussion, the issue can be considered moot. Every federal
court that has considered the issue has concluded that gay people have
suffered a history of discrimination on account of their classification as
gay people. 1 96
Thus, in adjudicating whether a classification that discriminates on
the basis of sexual orientation is deserving of heightened scrutiny, a
court should look only at (1) whether gays and lesbians have suffered
a history of discrimination and (2) whether their sexual orientation
affects their ability to contribute to society.
For the federal courts of appeals that have considered the issue,
however, another factor has proven decisive. Seven of the thirteen
federal courts of appeals have considered the claims of gay people for
heightened scrutiny of classifications that discriminate against them as
gay people. All of these courts found that sexual orientation does not
constitute a suspect classification. The five courts of appeals that
provided an explanation for their decision' 97 all found that homosexu-
ality, unlike race or gender, is a conduct-based classification. Indeed,
these courts concluded that the conduct that defines the class of
homosexuals is conduct that, under Bowers, the state may criminalize.
This conclusion led each court to further hold that classifications based
on sexual orientation are not suspect.'9 8
" See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1345 (9th Cir 1988), vacated
and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
957 (1990); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
436-37 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995); Jantz v.
Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548-49 (D. Kansas 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d
623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993); High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-70 (N.D. Cal. 1987) rev'd on
other grounds, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
"' The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit
have held that classifications based on sexual orientation do not merit heightened
scrutiny but neither provided any discussion of a rationale for its decision. See Baker
v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[W]e refuse to hold that homosexuals
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect classification .... "); Rich v. Secretary of the
Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) ("A classification based on one's choice
of sexual partners is not suspect.").
198 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 268 (6th
Cir. 1995) ("Bowers v. Hardwick and its progeny command that, as a matter of law,
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals cannot constitute either a 'suspect class' or a 'quasi-
suspect class."'); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("If the
government can criminalize homosexual conduct, a group that is defined by reference
to that conduct cannot constitute a 'suspect class."') (citing Padula v. Webster, 822
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The seminal case in this area is Padula v. Webster.' 99 In Padula the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
adjudicated a lesbian's claim that the FBI had refused to employ her
because she had been and currently was a "practicing homosexual. ' ' 200
The court expressly noted that the case did not concern a classification
based on "sexual orientation" and framed the issue before the court
precisely as "only whether homosexuals, when defined as persons who
engage in homosexual conduct, constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification.' '201
The court ruled that the Supreme Court's holding in Bowers, that a
Georgia law criminalizing sodomy did not offend the Due Process
Clause, controlled the issue of whether a classification based on ho-
mosexual "conduct" should receive heightened protection under the
Equal Protection Clause. "It would be quite anomalous, on its face,
to declare status defined by conduct that states may criminalize as
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
20 2
The Padula court made two profound errors. First, the court failed
to appreciate that the protections of the Equal Protection Clause are
F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If the Court [in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)] was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines
the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrim-
ination against the class is invidious.")); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) ("If for federal analysis we must
reach equal protection of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment . . . and if there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . it would be
incongruous to expand the reach of equal protection to find a fundamental right of
homosexual conduct under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment."); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir.
1989) ("If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals
do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis
scrutiny for equal protection purposes. The Constitution, in light of Hardwick, cannot
otherwise be rationally applied, lest an unjustified and indefensible inconsistency
result."); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990) ("After Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that
discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.").
'- 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
200 Id. at 99. The opinion does not make clear what homosexual conduct the plaintiff
practiced.
210 Id. at 102.
202 Id. at 103.
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independent of those of the Due Process Clause. 20 ' The Bowers Court
itself noted that the case did not present the Court with an equal
protection challenge. 20 4 Cass Sunstein has pointed out:
The principal flaw in ... Padula . . is that [the court] read the
Constitution as an undifferentiated unit, rather than as a set of entitle-
ments and prohibitions that are targeted at quite discrete problems. Each
constitutional provision must be taken on its own. [For example], [tihe
fact that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the state from regu-
lating all speech-related activities could not plausibly be a reason to
immunize speech from special First Amendment scrutiny. 20 1
203 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that
"there are two alternate routes to higher levels of scrutiny under the equal protection
clause [infringement of a fundamental right or adoption of a suspect classification)"
and criticizing the opinion of a prior panel which "seems to collapse the two separate
routes into one"); Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1339-42 (9th Cir
1988) (rejecting the argument that Bowers precluded an equal protection challenge to
regulations that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation), vacated and aff'd on
other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990);
Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (D. Kan. 1991) ("The Bowers court only
addressed the respondent's claim that the Georgia statute was a violation of due
process; equal protection was not in issue."), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993).
See also Sunstein, supra note 104, at 1164 (1988) ("statutes that are unaffected by
the Due Process Clause may be drawn into severe doubt by principles of equal
protection"); Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REV., 617, 625 (1989) (arguing that Bowers v. Hardwick does
not foreclose heightened scrutiny of classifications that disadvantage same-sex relation-
ships since "[a] same-sex relationship is in no way defined by, nor dependent upon,
sodomy"); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531,
545 (1992) (pointing out that if Bowers v. Hardwick had held that the Due Process
Clause protected a right to engage in sodomy, sexual orientation classifications would
not thereby have become suspect under the Equal Protection Clause); EDITORS OF THE
HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 93, at 15, 59-60.
20 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 n.8 (1986).
205 Sunstein, supra note 104, at 1167. Indeed, that sodomy may be and is criminalized
has been held repeatedly to be insufficient justification to infringe First Amendment
rights. See Gay Student Serv. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1328 (5th Cir.
1984) (rejecting state's interest in preventing speech likely to promote sodomy as
justification for state university's refusal to officially recognize a gay student group);
Gay Lib. v. Univ. of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 853-54 (8th Cir. 1977) (even accepting
"at face value" testimony that "homosexual behavior is compulsive" and "wherever
you have a convocation of homosexuals, . . . you are going to have increased ...
sodomy" a prior restraint on the First Amendment right of gays to associate is not
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Thus, even if the Padula court had been presented with a challenge to
an FBI practice of excluding sodomites from employment, Bowers would
not have determined whether a classification discriminating against
sodomites should receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
The classification at issue in Padula, however, was not based on
participation in sodomy, but rather participation in "homosexual con-
duct. "206 This points out the Padula court's second profound error. The
Padula court equated "homosexual conduct" with sodomy. 20 7 As noted
supra in Part III, Bowers dealt only with a challenge to Georgia's law
banning sodomy and did not hold that all types of gay erotic, romantic
and affectional conduct could be criminalized.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit com-
pounded this error in Steffan v. Perry2°8 by equating homosexual orien-
tation with sodomy. In Steffan, a former Naval Academy cadet challenged
the Academy's regulation prohibiting those with a homosexual orientation
from being enrolled at the Academy. 209 The court rejected the argument
that such a classification was suspect, reasoning that "as we explained
in Padula, if the government can criminalize homosexual conduct, a
group that is defined by reference to that conduct cannot constitute a
'suspect class."' 210 Thus, for the purposes of its heightened scrutiny
analysis, the court ignored the fact that the classification before it
justified); Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1976)
(even if associational activity of gays increases the opportunity for illegal gay sex,
"that fact is insufficient" to overcome the associational rights of members of a gay
organization); Gay Students Org. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir.
1974) ("undifferentiated fear" of illegal gay sex occurring is not a sufficient justification
for infringing First Amendment rights). See also Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381,
387-89 (D. R.I. 1980) (high school senior enjoys a First Amendment free speech right
to attend his senior prom escorted by his same-sex date).
206 Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
207 Id. at 102-04.
200 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
209 Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court expressed
uncertainty as to whether the Naval Academy had relied on Academy regulations or
those of the Department of Defense in recommending that Steffan be separated from
the academy in light of his statement that he was a homosexual. See id. at 684. Both
the relevant Academy regulation and the relevant regulation of the Department of
Defense provided for separation based on sexual orientation alone. See id. at 682-83;
id. at 707 (Wald, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 685 n.3 (emphasis added).
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related to orientation, not conduct, and redefined gay people as those
who engage in sodomy.
Having rejected the application of heightened scrutiny to the chal-
lenged regulation on this ground, the court conceded in subjecting the
regulation to rational review that "it is conceivable that someone would
describe himself as a homosexual based on his orientation . . . not-
withstanding the absence of any ongoing conduct or the probability of
engaging in such conduct. That there may be exceptions to the
assumption on which the regulation is premised is irrelevant, however,
so long as the classification . . . in the run of cases furthers its purpose,
and we readily conclude that it does." 2 1 ' Thus, the court concluded
"[Tihe military may reasonably assume that when a member states
that he is a homosexual, that member either engages or is likely to
engage in homosexual conduct. '2 12
Remarkably, the other federal courts of appeals that have addressed
the issue have mirrored the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in effectively equating a homosexual orientation with
the practice of sodomy. 2 3 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
211 Id. at 686. The Steffan Court's reasoning is paradigmatic of what David Halperin
has identified as the "discourses of homophobia" which "operate precisely by deploying
a series of mutually contradictory premises in such a way that any one of them can
be substituted for any other, as different circumstances may require, without changing
the final outcome of the argument." DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARD
A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY, 37-38 (1995). Had the Steffan Court conceded in addressing the
heightened scrutiny argument that "it is conceivable that someone would describe
himself as a homosexual based on his orientation . . . notwithstanding the absence of
any ongoing conduct or the probability of engaging in such conduct," it could not
logically have concluded that sexual orientation is defined by conduct.
212 Steffan, 41 F.3d at 686.
213 See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th
Cir. 1995) ("[Ilt is virtually impossible to distinguish or separate individuals of a
particular orientation which predisposes them toward a particular sexual conduct from
those who actually engage in that particular type of sexual conduct."); Meinhold v.
U.S. Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994) (in adjudicating a challenge
to a classification based on sexual orientation, citing to High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990), which held that a
classification based on homosexual conduct was not suspect, for support of the
proposition that "classifications having to do with homosexuality may survive challenge
if there is any rational basis for them"); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463-
65 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he regulation [which classified plaintiff based upon her status
as a lesbian] does not classify plaintiff merely based upon her status as a lesbian, but
upon reasonable inferences about her probable conduct in the past and in the future.");
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Circuit was even more explicit when engaging in such circular reasoning
in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh.21 4 In Ben-Shalom a sergeant in the Army Reserve
challenged a regulation that barred her reenlistment because of her
homosexual orientation." 5 After noting that the regulation on its face
discriminated against persons with a homosexual orientation "absent
any allegations of sexual misconduct,' '216 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit remarked:
In the present case, plaintiff is an avowed lesbian, there is no confusion
about that. . . . Plaintiff's lesbian acknowledgement, if not an admission
of its practice, at least can rationally and reasonably be viewed as reliable
evidence of a desire and propensity to engage in homosexual conduct.
Such an assumption cannot be said to be without individual exceptions,
but it is compelling evidence that plaintiff has in the past and is likely
to again engage in such conduct. To this extent, therefore, the regulation
does not classify plaintiff merely based upon her status as a lesbian, but
upon reasonable inferences about her probable conduct in the past and
in the future.2 1
7
The court then concluded that because homosexual "conduct" may
constitutionally be criminalized, homosexuals do not constitute a suspect
or quasi-suspect class.2 1 8 "The Constitution, in light of Hardwick, cannot
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1074 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that
the plaintiff had admitted that "he was attracted sexually to, or desired sexual activity
with, members of his own sex, that since he knew of no gay officers he sought the
company of gay enlisted men, that he [does], and will continue to associate with other
homosexuals, and that he wanted to remain in the Navy as an honest, open, gay
officer" and concluding "[w]hile acts of sodomy have not been expressly admitted by
[plaintiff), . . . in view of the above [non-sexual behavior] we need not address the
factual situation where there is action based solely on status as a person with a
homosexual orientation" (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1003 (1990).
See also generally Hunter, supra note 203, at 533-43 (describing how courts have come
to transform sodomy into a proxy for homosexuality).
214 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
215 Id. at 457 n.3 (the regulation at issue disqualified from service any homosexual
and defined a homosexual as "an individual . . . who desires bodily contact between
persons of the same sex . . . with the intent of obtaining or giving sexual gratification"
even if there is no evidence that the individual has engaged in homosexual acts)
(emphasis added).
216 Id. at 463.
21 Id. at 464.
218 Id. at 464-65.
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otherwise be rationally applied, lest an unjustified and indefensible
inconsistency result." 19
Ben-Shalom and Steffan suffer from two fatal errors, one of legal
reasoning and the other factual. The reasoning is flawed analytically
because the courts failed to address the classification before them. No
classification can be suspect under such an analysis.
Assume, for example, an equal protection challenge to a law that
bans men from military service because men are statistically more
likely to commit rape than are women. Under the explicit reasoning
of Ben-Shalom, and the implicit reasoning of Steffan, "[p]laintiff's [male-
ness], if not an admission of [rape], at least can rationally and
reasonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and propensity
to [commit rape]. Such an assumption cannot be said to be without
individual exceptions, but it is compelling evidence that plaintiff has
in the past and is likely to again engage in [rape]. To this extent,
therefore, the regulation does not classify plaintiff merely based upon
his status as a [man], but upon reasonable inferences about his probable
conduct in the past and in the future."2 20
In transforming sexual orientation-the classification before it-into
a classification based on presumed group sexual conduct, and then
deciding the heightened scrutiny issue by reference to the latter clas-
sification, the Ben-Shalom court went astray of "the basic principle that
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect
persons, not groups."221 For the purposes of equal protection jurispru-
dence, there are no "suspect classes" per se, only suspect classifica-
tions.22 2 Thus, the focus of the court should be on the classification
before it as it relates to the individual plaintiff.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 464. See also Dahl v. Secretary of the Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1334-35
n.17 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (military's homosexual exclusion policy "is indistinguishable
from a patently unconstitutional hypothetical policy providing that ethnic minorities
must be excluded from military service because they have a 'propensity' to engage in
theft, although non-minority service members are not excluded unless and until they
engage in theft").
22 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). See also id. at
2118 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[U]nder our constitution there can be no such thing
as a creditor or debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution's focus upon
the individual.").
222 Thus, a ruling that sexual orientation is a suspect classification would confer no
"special rights" upon gay people, since non-gay people also have a sexual orientation.
Indeed, heightened scrutiny of such classifications would render state affirmative action
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The sexual behavior of gay people as a class remains relevant to this
analysis only to the extent that it informs as to the meaning the
government intended for its classification. The factual error that Steffan
and Ben-Shalom have in common is the equation of a gay sexual
orientation with sodomy. This equation pervades the law.2 3
In reality, while the majority of non-gay people engage in sodomy,22 4
many gay people do not.22 5 Indeed, no sexual behavior is common to
or other special entitlements for gay people inherently suspect. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (all remedial race-based government action is subject to strict scrutiny).
The perception that gay people will benefit disproportionately from heightened
scrutiny of all classifications based upon sexual orientation reflects the reality that
homosexuals have suffered and continue to suffer disproportionately under such clas-
sifications.
22 See Gay Activists v. Lomenzo, 320 N.Y.S.2d 994, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1971) ("in
order to be a homosexual, the prohibited act [of sodomy] must have at some time
been committed, or at least presently [be] contemplated"), rev'd sub nom. Owles v.
Lomenzo, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Gay Activists Alliance
v. Lomenzo, 293 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1973); Head v. Newton, 596 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1980) (the term "queer" is slanderous per se because it imputes criminal
sodomy); see also Gaylord v. Tacoma School District, 559 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Wash.
1977) ("sexual gratification with a member of one's own sex is implicit in the term
homosexual"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). See also Gay Student Serv. v. Texas
A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1323 (5th Cir. 1984) (reciting the testimony of Dr.
Paul Cameron that "it would be a shock really, if there were not homosexual acts
engaged in at or immediately after a meeting of a homosexual student organization");
Pershing, supra note 178, at 292-93 n.11 (1994) (pointing out the error of courts that
deny child custody to a gay parent because of the illegality of sodomy in the jurisdiction:
"[N]o personal relationship, regardless of the living arrangement that attends it and
the sexual orientation of the parties, necessarily entails certain intimate acts or should
be presumed to do so."); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 1985)
(expressing the fear that permitting a lesbian mother to travel with her children outside
of Pennsylvania, which does not criminalize homosexual sodomy, "could clearly place
the children in a situation with the mother and [her lesbian partner], where the adults
could be subject to arrest and prosecution for deviant sexual behavior").
But see Gay Student Serv. v. Texas A & M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317, 1328 (5th Cir.
1984) ("[W]hile Texas law may prohibit certain homosexual practices [sodomy], no
Texas law makes it illegal to be a homosexual."); Gay Alliance of Students v.
Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1976) ("While Virginia law proscribes the
practice of certain forms of homosexual [sex] . . . Virginia law does not make it a
crime to be a homosexual. Indeed, a statute criminalizing such status and prescribing
punishment therefor would be invalid.") (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962)).
2214 See EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY:
SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 98, 101-07 (1994) (a survey of a representative
614
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all gay people. The physiology and genetics research discussed supra in
Part II speaks directly to this issue because it evidences that sexual
orientation is only a genetically influenced and physiologically based
predisposition toward an erotic, affectional and romantic attraction to
individuals of one's own sex. 226 Such evidence speaks to the reality of
an irreducible essentialist conception of homosexuality-connoting only
same-sex desire. Thus, such evidence debunks the factual premise-
that homosexuality is a status defined by conduct, specifically, gay
sexual conduct-that undergirds in part the decisions denying height-
ened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation.
27
sample of American adults between the ages of 18 and 60, conducted by the National
Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, found that approximately 70%
of non-gay respondents had engaged in oral sex and that nearly 20% of the non-gay
female respondents had engaged in oral sex during their most recent sexual experience);
see also, PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 236 (1983) (finding
that 90% of non-gay couples have engaged in fellatio and 93% in cunnilingus and
that same-sex couples engaged in oral sex only slightly more frequently than opposite
sex couples), cited in EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 93, at 130
n.85; S. HITE, THE HITE REPORT ON MALE SEXUALITY 1121 (1981) (approximately
96% of the male survey respondents had performed cunnilingus on a female partner);
C. TARVIS & S. SADD, THE REDBOOK REPORT ON FEMALE SEXUALITY 163 (1977) (85%
of female survey respondents performed fellatio on their husbands at least "occasion-
ally" and 20.3% of the female survey respondents had engaged in anal intercourse
with their husbands more than once); S.N. Seidman and R.O. Reider, A Review of
Sexual Behavior in the United States, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 151: 330 (1994) (anal intercourse
is practiced by 10% of non-gay couples at least occasionally).
225 See, e.g., PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 236 (1983)
(finding that 23% of lesbians rarely or never engage in oral sex and that mutual
masturbation is the most common practice among gay male couples), cited in EDITORS
OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 93, at 59 n.99; Sister Marla, Gay and
Celibate at Sixty-Five, in LESBIAN NUNS 133 (R. Curb & N. Manahan eds. 1985 (lesbian
nun declaring her celibacy), cited in EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Supra
note 93, at 59 n.100. See also D.E. KANOUSE ET AL., RESPONSE TO THE AIDS EPIDEMIC:
A SURVEY OF HOMOSEXUAL AND BISEXUAL MEN IN Los ANGELES COUNTY (RAND,
1991) (13% of gay and bisexual men reporting that they had no sexual partner in the
previous year); ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITY 109 (1978)
(finding manual stimulation to be the sexual technique most commonly employed in
lesbian sex).
226 See Herek, supra note 11.
..7 Compare Halley, supra note 10, at 517. Halley recognizes the importance of
distinguishing between status and conduct for equal protection analysis of sexual
orientation classifications. She argues, however, that "[t]he constructivist view that
sexual orientation is mutable because of slippages and rearrangements of desire, fantasy,
behavior, private identity, and public identity is possibly the strongest refutation of a
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Even though a gay sexual orientation provides sound information
about which sexual conduct an individual may prefer, it exists inde-
pendent of that conduct. The common essential element that defines
all gay people as gay people is only a same-sex desire. One can be
gay even if one also is celibate or even if one practices exclusively
heferosexual sex. 22
8
Thus, unless a classification expressly defines gay people as persons
who engage in same-sex sodomy, 229 a court should treat a classification
definition of homosexuality that makes sodomy its essence . . . by emphasizing the
variety of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and queer identities." Id. at 564. Although Halley
concedes that most contemporary attempts at justification for anti-gay discrimination
derive from the view that sexual orientation is mutable, id. at 518, she nevertheless
argues against making pro-gay arguments premised on a biological etiology of sexual
orientation because such a premise leaves unchallenged the arguments that gay sex is
immoral or disrupts the civil order and, therefore, may validate the premises of anti-
gay eugenics. Id. at 506, 521, 523. This argument is divorced from reality. Even
when a gene that influences sexual orientation is isolated, it will not be possible to
determine definitively based upon whether a person carries that gene if that person is
gay or will grow up to be gay. See HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 35, at 218 (drawing
this conclusion from studies that indicate that the identical twin of a gay man has
only a roughly 50% chance of being gay). Moreover, it is unlikely, to say the least,
that an expectant mother who knows that her fetus carries a "gay gene" and who
does not wish to have a gay child will be induced to abort her fetus because gay
litigants have advanced the "nature" argument in court or will be deterred from
aborting her fetus because queer theorists have argued against recognition and use of
medical reality.
Halley further argues against making equal protection arguments premised on any
theory that sexual orientation is immutable (regardless of whether its original cause is
biological or environmental) because people who suffer anti-gay discrimination differ
with respect to their position as to the immutability of their sexual orientation, and,
thus, such a premise excludes from protection a subset of those on whose behalf it is
articulated. Halley, supra note 10, at 528, 556, 564. What is significant for equal
protection purposes about the physiology and genetics research, however, is not that
it supports the immutability argument (which is does), but that it suggests that sexual
orientation exists apart from any sexual conduct. Even those with a same-sex desire
who believe that their sexual orientation is "constructed" and mutable would share
in the protection likely to derive from judicial recognition of this status/conduct
distinction. Further, to the extent that those who have constructed their "gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and queer identities" (or who have had those identities constructed for them)
do not even possess a same-sex desire necessary to fall within the essentialist definition
of "gay" set forth in my argument above, it is difficult to see how they can be
classified as gay without respect to their conduct.
228 Further, that an individual is gay does not necessarily say anything about how
that individual experiences his sexuality. For example, one can be gay and at the
same time reject gay sex as immoral.
22 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. S 170-B:4 (1987) (New Hampshire law forbidding
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based on homosexuality or sexual orientation as one independent of
any conduct.230 Indeed, courts have begun to recognize that homosexual
orientation exists apart from any sexual conduct.231
The latest federal appeals court to address the issue of whether sexual
orientation is a suspect classification, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, however, has not only repeated the errors of Padula and Ben-
Shalom, but has added a novel error to this line of cases, grounded in
part in its misunderstanding of the natures of both sexual orientation
and equal protection. In Equality Foundation of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati,232
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the holding of the
district court that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification,
any "homosexual" from adopting children and defining "homosexual" as "any person
who performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another person of the same gender").
230 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, .377
(9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("It is not
enough to say that the category is 'behavioral.' One can make behavioral classes out
of persons who go to church on Saturdays, persons who speak Spanish, or persons
who walk with crutches. The question is what causes the behavior? Does it arise from
the kind of a characteristic that belongs peculiarly to a group that the equal protection
clause should especially protect?").
231 See, e.g., Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994)
(referring to a navy regulation that, as applied, assumed that persons who say they
are gay will engage in certain prohibited sexual conduct, the court remarked "at least
a serious question is raised whether it can ever be rational to presume that one class
of persons (identified by their sexual preference alone) will violate regulations whereas
another class (identified by their preference) will not"); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850
F. Supp. 910, 919, 925 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (citing to "substantial uncontroverted
evidence that a distinction between homosexual orientation and homosexual conduct
is well grounded in fact" and, therefore, holding that "to the extent that the
Government's policy [of expelling gay service members from the military] is based on
the unfounded presumption that service members with a homosexual orientation will
engage in proscribed homosexual conduct, the policy is not rationally based"); Evans
v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo. 1994) ("While it is true that such a law
[prohibiting homosexual sodomy] could be passed and found constitutional under the
United States' constitution, it does not follow from that fact that denying the right of
an identifiable group [homosexuals] (who may or may not engage in homosexual
sodomy) to participate in the political process is also constitutionally permissible.");
Donovan v. Fiumara, 442 S.E.2d 572, 575, 577 (N.C. 1994) (holding that "the label
of 'gay' or 'bisexual' does not carry with it an automatic reference to any particular
sexual activity," and thus, rejecting plaintiffs argument that defendant's claim that
plaintiffs were gay or bisexual imputes to them commission of the crime of sodomy
under North Carolina law).
232 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
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which was premised in part on the district court's findings "that there
is a broad distinction between sexual orientation, and sexual conduct"
and that sexual orientation is an immutable and involuntary trait.21 3
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit provided dual rationales
for overruling the district court. In accordance with Ben-Shalom, the
court found that "it is virtually impossible to distinguish or separate
individuals of a particular orientation which predisposes them toward
a particular sexual conduct from those who actually engage in that
particular type of sexual conduct." 34 Thus, in accordance with Padula,
the court concluded: "Bowers v. Hardwick and its progeny command
that, as a matter of law, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals cannot constitute
either a 'suspect class' or a 'quasi-suspect class."' 235
The Equality court also provided a novel rationale for its holding
that sexual orientation is not a classification deserving of heightened
scrutiny. Accepting, for the sake of argument only, the trial court's
characterization of the nature of sexual orientation, 236 the court con-
cluded that "no law can successfully be drafted that is calculated to
burden or penalize, or to benefit or protect, an unidentifiable group
or class of individuals whose identity is defined by subjective and
233 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (citing to testimony that "sexual orientation" is a "predisposition
toward erotic, sexual, affiliation or affection relationship toward one's own and/or the
other gender"), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). The Equality Foundation of
Cincinnati filed this law suit to challenge the constitutionality of a voter-enacted
amendment to the Charter of the City of Cincinnati which provided in part:
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact,
adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule, or policy which
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or
relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis
to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other
preferential treatment.
Id. at 422.
23 Id. at 267. The court cited specifically only to testimony that "most people either
engage in sexual behavior which is consistent with their sexual orientation or engage
in no sexual behavior at all." Id. Such testimony expressly contradicts the court's
holding that sexual orientation is indistinguishable from sexual behavior, unless one
interprets the testimony to mean that those who engage in no sexual behavior have
no sexual orientation.
235 Id. at 268.
236 Id. at 267.
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unapparent characteristics such as innate desires, drives, and thoughts.
Those persons having a homosexual 'orientation' simply do not, as
such, comprise an identifiable class." '237 Noting that "[m]any homo-
sexuals successfully conceal their orientation," the court further rea-
soned that gay people, therefore, could only be identified through
conduct "such as public displays of homosexual affection or self-
proclamation of homosexual tendencies" and, thus, could only be
discriminated against on the basis of such conduct. 2 8
The court's truncated reasoning leaves the reader seeking an expla-
nation for its unstated conclusion. The court does not explain why it
believes that discrimiriation that is actualized only as a result of self-
identification does not offend the constitution. 23 9 More precisely, in
light of the settled law that a state is not free to discriminate, for
237 Id.
2138 Id. at 267. People who have negative attitudes toward gay people are less likely
to have had personal contact with a person whom they know to be gay. Gregory M.
Herek, Assessing Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men: A Review of Empirical
Research With the ATLG Scale, in LESBIAN AND GAY PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY, RESEARCH,
AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 206, 219 (Beverly Greene & Gregory M. Herek eds.,
1994); Gregory M. Herek & Eric K. Glunt, Interpersonal Contact and Heterosexuals'
Attitudes Toward Gay Men: Results from a National Survey J. SEx RES. 30:239-44 (1993)
("Heterosexual men and women who report knowing someone who is gay express
generally more positive attitudes toward lesbians and gay men than do heterosexuals
who lack contact experiences."); Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice and Violence
Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) (summarizing the
research). This suggests that much hostility toward gay people is based on popular
stereotypes rather than first-hand information.
Thus, even if an individual gay person may decrease his chances of suffering
discrimination aimed at him personally by "successfully conceal[ing his] sexual ori-
entation," his decision to remain closeted about his sexual orientation might also tend
to perpetuate discrimination against gay people in the aggregate. See Jonathan Rauch,
Homosexuals and Victimology: Beyond Oppression, NEw REPUBLIC, May 10, 1993, at 18,
23 (arguing that social progress for gays will come, not through an "oppression model"
of politics that seeks enactment of anti-discrimination legislation, but through "personal
action" whereby openly gay people change anti-gay attitudes through honesty and
moral example); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592,
610 (Cal. 1979) ("[O]ne important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce
homosexual individuals to 'come out of the closet,' acknowledge their sexual prefer-
ences, and to associate with others in working for equal rights.").
"I The explanation that discrimination that is actualized only upon self-identification
is somehow inherently less invidious must be rejected. Taken to its logical extreme,
such reasoning would justify even Nazi Germany's extermination of those Jews who
identified themselves as Jewish.
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example, against Americans of Irish descent merely because an Irish-
American could pass as an American of English descent, the court
does not explain why the "closet" exception to the Equal Protection
Clause is applicable to classifications based on sexual orientation but
not to classifications based on national origin.
Further, the court's conclusion that no law can be drafted to suc-
cessfully discriminate against a closeted gay person is also fallacious.
Leaving aside the issue of discrimination based on perceived sexual
orientation and the question of whether sexual orientation is, as the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit suggests, always concealable, a
law that, for example, bans a gay person from adopting a child2 °
undeniably discriminates against the gay person who wants to adopt a
child. He must either break the law or forego adopting a child.
Moreover, such a law also discriminates profoundly against every
gay person, regardless of whether or not he or she has any interest in
adopting a child, because of the stigma such a law attaches to a gay
sexual orientation. 24 1 "To separate [gay people] from others of similar
. . . qualifications solely because of their [sexual orientation] generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.' '242
Indeed, "[b]ecause the stigma [against homosexuality] is attached not
simply to an obviously random characteristic, such as skin pigmenta-
tion, but to the deepest desires of the human heart, . . . it can eat
away at a person's sense of his own dignity with peculiar ferocity. ' 243
240 See FLA. STAT. ANN. S 63.042(2)(3)(d) (West 1985) ("No person eligible to adopt
under this statute may adopt if that person is homosexual."). 1
241 See Ellen Goodman, Gay Policy Won't Work, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July
16, 1993, at 23A ("[T]he primary symbol of gay repression hasn't been the ghetto or
a list of segregation laws. It's been the much more psychologically complex image of
the closet: the dark place where cultural hate meets, and makes, self-hate .... "). See
also Employment Discrimination Against Gay Men, in HOMOSEXUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 27, 28 (J. Harry & M. Das eds. 1980) (closeted gays may hurt their
chances for career advancement by intentionally limiting their job related social
interactions).
212 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also Miller, supra
note 179, at 1290 (arguing that "[r]elegating sexuality to the private sphere revives
an element of the old 'separate but equal' doctrine-the belief that the separation of
one group from the world of more general social interaction is neither unequal nor
stigmatizing").
243 Sullivan, supra note 9, at 24, 35 (arguing that discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation differs from that based on race in that the former "attacks the very
heart of what makes a human being human: her ability to love and be loved").
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V. CONCLUSION
Classifications, like race, that historically have been used to saddle
certain people with disabilities on the basis of a characteristic that
otherwise would be irrelevant to an individual's ability to contribute
to society are inherently suspect as more likely to have been the product
of irrational prejudice and, thus, are deserving of heightened equal
protection scrutiny. Thus, in adjudicating whether a sexual orientation
classification is deserving of heightened equal protection scrutiny, a
court should ask only whether gay people have suffered a history of
discrimination and whether their sexual orientation says anything about
their ability to contribute to society.
The federal courts of appeals that have adjudicated the constitution-
ality of such sexual orientation classifications have avoided answering
these questions, however, by holding that homosexuality, unlike race,
is a classification based on conduct that falls outside the scope of
protections afforded by the "liberty" of the Due Process Clause. These
courts have not only failed to appreciate that the protections of the
Equal Protection Clause are independent of those of the Due Process
Clause, but have also profoundly erred in equating a gay sexual
orientation with participation in homosexual sex. Further, in conclud-
ing, if only implicitly, that a state may constitutionally proscribe all
same-sex erotic activity, these courts also have failed to recognize that
the decision of a gay person to participate in such same-sex erotic
activity is among "the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, [is] central to personal dignity and autonomy,
[and, thus, is] central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' ' 4
The physiology and genetics research discussed supra in Part II
should inform both the equal protection and the due process analyses
at issue. This research evidences that sexual orientation is only a
genetically influenced and physiologically based predisposition toward
an erotic, affectional and romantic attraction to individuals of one's
own sex and exists independent of any physical sexual conduct. Thus,
such evidence speaks to the reality of an irreducible essentialist con-
ception of homosexuality-connoting only same-sex desire-which un-
dermines the factual premise-that homosexuality is a status defined
244 See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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by conduct-of the equation of a gay sexual orientation with gay sex.
Further, this research evidences that sexual orientation, unlike sexual
conduct, involves no volition. We cannot choose to redirect our sexual
orientation. For this reason, the decision to engage in same-sex erotic
activity, or to abstain from doing so, is qualitatively commensurate
with such other deeply personal, and constitutionally protected, deci-
sions relating to family, marriage, and procreation and should be
commensurate in constitutional status under the Due Process Clause.
Finally, we can be confident that science will speak even louder to
these issues in the near future. While geneticists to date have only
detected the presence of a "gay gene," that gene and others that
influence sexual orientation are almost certain to be isolated in the
very near future. Then it will be possible to determine both how and
when these genes influence sexual orientation. This knowledge is likely
to impact not only the constitutional analyses relating to laws that
repress gay people but also many of the homophobic conceptions that
manifest themselves in the enactment of such laws.
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